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1. Europe
Ukraine – Russia: violations of the Minsk agreement and reciprocal
accusations
Violence continued in Eastern Ukraine throughout the reporting period, with
consistent violations of the 2015 Minsk ceasefire agreement reportedly being
committed by both sides.1 At the same time, parties to the conflict repeatedly
reiterated their full commitment to a permanent ceasefire.2
1The Special Monitoring Mission recorded a total of 476 civilian casualties in 2017, including 86 fatalities.
See OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Status Report as of 10 January 2018 (12 January 2018)
www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/366306?download=true.
2See, e.g. OSCE, ‘Press Statement of the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Ambas-
sador Martin Sajdik after the Meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 23 August 2017’ (24 August
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Both Ukraine and Russia continued accusing each other of violations of
international law. In a Security Council meeting dated 20 September 2017,
the Ukrainian representative recalled that ‘in 2014 Russia unleashed an
armed aggression against Ukraine and occupied part of [Ukrainian] territory.
… It is an undeniable fact that Russia creates, leads, controls and sponsors ter-
rorist operations in Donbas.’3 In another Security Council meeting, Russia
claimed that ‘there was and is no proof of those allegations’,4 contending
instead that ‘there is proof of a number of violations of international law by
[Ukraine]’, referring inter alia to ‘endless bombardment’.5
Meanwhile, the Council of the European Union extended ‘restrictive
measures over actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity,
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine’ against 149 persons and 38 entities,
until 15 March 2018.6 On 21 December 2017, the Council prolonged the
economic sanctions against Russia for another 6 months due to the lack of
implementation of the Minsk agreement.7 The EU’s restrictive measures
against Russia ‘in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol’
were prolonged until 23 June 2018.8
Terrorist attacks in Spain
On 17 August 2017, 14 people were killed and over 100 injured when a white
van mowed down tourists and residents on Barcelona’s famous Las Ramblas
boulevard.9 The following day, one person was killed and several injured
when a car hit pedestrians in the town of Cambrils. Both attacks were
linked to an accidental explosion one day earlier in a beach house in
Alcanar, killing two suspected terrorists.10 The ‘Islamic State’ (IS, ISIS, ISIL,
also known as Da’esh) claimed that the attacks were carried out by its
2017) www.osce.org/chairmanship/336531; OSCE, ‘Press statement of Special Representative of OSCE
Chairperson-in-Office Sajdik after the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 20 December 2017’
(20 December 2017) www.osce.org/chairmanship/363671.
3The representative subsequently showed identification cards of Russian officers and soldiers in order to
proof Russian presence in Donbas. See UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8051 (20 September 2017)
12/35. In similar vein, see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8040 (5 September 2017) 4/4; UNSC Ver-
batim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8006 (19 July 2017) 8/35 (including a reference to ‘the occupation of
Crimea’). For a similar statement by Lithuania, see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8144 (20 Decem-
ber 2017) 29/67.
4UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8144 (20 December 2017) 22/67.
5Ibid.
6Council of the EU, ‘EU prolongs sanctions over actions against Ukraine’s territorial integrity until 15 March
2018’ (14 September 2018) www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/09/14/ukraine-
sanctions/.
7Council of the EU, ‘Russia: EU prolongs economic sanctions by six months’ (21 December 2018) www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/21/russia-eu-prolongs-economic-sanctions-by-
six-months/.
8See Council of the EU, ‘Timeline – EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine’ www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/.
9‘Barcelona and Cambrils attacks: What we know so far’, BBC News (17 August 2017) www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-europe-40964242.
10Ibid.
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‘soldiers’ in response to Spain’s involvement in the US-led coalition against IS
in Iraq, but their links to the organisation were not established.11 The Spanish
Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy referred to the events as ‘jihadi terrorism’12
and the UN Security Council condemned the ‘barbaric and cowardly terrorist
attack’ in the strongest terms.13
2. Africa
Libya: Joint Declaration, renewed US airstrikes, and accusations
against UAE
A Joint Declaration made on 25 July 2017 between Fayez Al Sarraj (Chairman
of the Presidential Council of Libya) and Khalifa Haftar (commander of the
Libyan National Army) initially seemed like a return to stability for Libya,
as both parties declared to
commit to a ceasefire and to refrain from any use of armed force for any
purpose that does not strictly constitute counter-terrorism, in compliance
with the Libyan Political Agreement and international treaties… 14
The statement was a breakthrough after peace talks in May in Abu Dhabi had
proved unproductive, and it eased the tension between Sarraj’s UN-backed
Tripoli-based government and the armed troops of Haftar, supported by
Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.15
Nonetheless, in the twilight days of 2017, Haftar called Sarraj’s government
‘obsolete’ at a military graduation ceremony, and hinted at running in the
elections in the spring of 2018.16 In response, the President of the UN Security
Council declared that
[t]he Libyan Political Agreement (LPA)… remains the only viable framework
to end the Libyan political crisis and… its implementation remains key to
holding elections and finalising the political transition.… The Security
Council underscores that there can be no military solution to the crisis…
The Council repeats its call on all Libyans to respect the ceasefire, as called
for in the Joint Declaration issued after the meeting in Paris on 25 July 2017.17
11Ibid.
12Giles Tremlett et al., ‘Cambrils: five terror suspects killed as second attack follows Las Ramblas’, The Guar-
dian (18 August 2017), www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/17/van-crashes-into-crowd-of-people-
barcelona-las-ramblas.
13Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Barcelona, Spain (17 August 2017) Press Release
UN Doc SC/12960.
14France, France Diplomatie, ‘Libya – Joint Declaration (Paris)’ (25 July 2017).
15‘Libya’s PM, eastern commander commit to ceasefire, election’, Reuters (25 July 2017) www.reuters.com/
article/us-libya-security-france/libyas-pm-eastern-commander-commit-to-ceasefire-election-
idUSKBN1AA1I8.
16Ayman al-Warfalli, ‘East Libyan commander Haftar says U.N.-backed government obsolete, hints may run
in elections’, Reuters (17 December 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/east-libyan-
commander-haftar-says-u-n-backed-government-obsolete-hints-may-run-in-elections-idUSKBN1EB0FB.
17UNSC Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/PRST/2017/26 (14 December 2017).
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September 2017 also saw the United States resume its operations in Libya; it
carried out two airstrikes on IS outposts on 24 and 28 September.18 These
were the ﬁrst US strikes in Libya since president Trump took ofﬁce, with
the previous known US airstrike on Libyan soil dating back to 19 January
2017.19
Mali: MINUSMA mandate extension, France-Mali incident, and
struggling G5 Sahel task force launch
In spite of the presence of a French force of some 4.000 troops and the deploy-
ment of some 10.000 UN peacekeepers under the Multidimensional Inte-
grated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA),20 Mali continued to
struggle to find stability in the second half of 2017.
French forces continued their counter-terrorism operations in the country,
with French defence minister Florence Parly announcing in September that
France had decided to arm its intelligence and surveillance drones.21
An incident nonetheless occurred between France and Mali when a
Malian news outlet announced that a French raid against a camp of the Isla-
mist group Ansar Dine in the Abeibara region on 23 October had not only
neutralised 15 militants, but also killed 11 Malian soldiers. The Malian
Defence Ministry released a statement stating that the ‘Malian soldiers,
detained by the terrorists, died’.22 A French source offered a different
view of the events, and said the raid was carried out ‘on the basis of detailed
intelligence against a camp that included Malians who had joined the Isla-
mist ranks.… They were not prisoners’.23 Another French source told
Reuters that ‘[w]e have a real trust problem with the Malians’.24 The state-
ments caused a row, with Mali’s President denying the assertions, leading
France’s defence minister Florence Parly to guarantee that her services
had ‘factual information’ about the desertions.25
18United States of America, AFRICOM, ‘U.S. Conducts Precision Strikes in Libya’ (24 September 2017) www.
africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/29924/u-s-conducts-precision-strikes-in-libya.
19Idrees Ali, ‘U.S. air strikes kill 17 Islamic State militants in Libya: U.S. military’, Reuters (24 September
2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-libya-strike/u-s-air-strikes-kill-17-islamic-state-militants-in-libya-
u-s-military-idUSKCN1BZ0P5.
20UNSC Res 2364, UN Doc S/RES/2364 (29 June 2017), extending MINUSMA’s mandate for another year.
21‘France turns to armed drones in fight against Sahel militants’, Reuters (5 September 2017) www.reuters.
com/article/us-france-drones/france-turns-to-armed-drones-in-fight-against-sahel-militants-
idUSKCN1BG2K2.
22‘French raid last month killed hostage Malian soldiers’, Reuters (6 November 2017) www.reuters.com/
article/us-mali-france/french-raid-last-month-killed-hostage-malian-soldiers-idUSKBN1D62JM.
23‘Malian soldiers killed in French strike had joined Islamists: source’, Reuters (7 November 2017) www.
reuters.com/article/us-mali-france-deserters/malian-soldiers-killed-in-french-strike-had-joined-islamists-
source-idUSKBN1D71M8.
24Ibid.
25‘Mali’s president contradicts French account of military strike’, Reuters (3 December 2017) www.reuters.
com/article/us-mali-france/malis-president-contradicts-french-account-of-military-strike-
idUSKBN1DX0B0.
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Another military initiative in the region finally gathered form when the
much-discussed cross-border G5 Sahel Joint Force26 was discussed at a
summit involving Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania (the G5
Sahel). France strongly supported the summit and linked the launch of the
new force to a possible future termination of its own operation in the country:
[i]t’s not wrong to say that it’s part of an exit plan because the Barkhanemission
is not intended to be there [forever], but it’s hard to see how we could draw
down soon. We need a long-term multilateral strategy so that we’re less
exposed. The time of doing everything alone in West Africa is over.27
Although there was no shortage of enthusiasm for the task force, a lack of
funding proved problematic. Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and
Niger’s Mahamadou Issoufou noted that ‘[i]t is important that the inter-
national community takes note of this and gets together to give us resources
to ensure our mission can be accomplished.…We have only limited
means’.28
While the United States expressed its support for the force, high-level offi-
cials stressed that the US already funded more than a quarter of the $7.3
billion UN peacekeeping budget and wanted to know ‘what the strategy
would be, how they see this playing out, what’s involved in it’ before commit-
ting to funding.29 Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
committed EUR 130 million (USD 152.75 million) to the force, and Saudi
Arabia’s foreign minister Adel al-Jubeir additionally said that his country
would also ‘provide logistics, training, intelligence and air support through
the Islamic military coalition to this effort’.30
From 19 to 22 October, the UN Security Council carried out an assessment
visit to the Sahel region,31 with the G5 Sahel force launching its first operation
‘HAW BI’ soon thereafter and deploying several hundred soldiers from Mali,
Niger and Burkina Faso.32
26Identical letters dated 8 February 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Mali to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council A/71/
786–S /2017/113 (27 February 2017).
27John Irish and Emma Farge, ‘Heading to Sahel, France’s Macron scrambles for exit strategy’, Reuters (30
June 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-france-sahel/heading-to-sahel-frances-macron-scrambles-for-
exit-strategy-idUSKBN19L0FM.
28‘Niger, Mali Leaders Seek Funding for New Anti-jihadist Force’, VOA (13 September 2017) www.voanews.
com/a/niger-mali-seek-funding-anti-jijadist-force/4027849.html.
29Michelle Nichols, ‘U.S. wants Sahel force strategy before giving money: officials’, Reuters (28 October
2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-security-usa/u-s-wants-sahel-force-strategy-before-giving-
money-officials-idUSKBN1CX06Z.
30John Irish, ‘Saudi-backed military alliance to help G5 Sahel fight: minister’, Reuters (14 December 2017)
www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-security-sahel-saudi/saudi-backed-military-alliance-to-help-g5-sahel-
fight-minister-idUSKBN1E81IH.
31Letter dated 16 October 2017 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-
General, UN Doc S/2017/871 (17 October 2017).
32‘G5 Sahel launches military operation in African scrublands’, Reuters (2 November 2017) www.reuters.
com/article/us-africa-security/g5-sahel-launches-military-operation-in-african-scrublands-
idUSKBN1D21VS.
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Only one month after the G5 Sahel force operations commenced, however,
a source close to Emmanuel Macron expressed the French President’s dissa-
tisfaction, saying that
Emmanuel Macron believes that it’s not going quickly enough and that the ter-
rorists have registered military and symbolic victories, especially in Niger, and
[that] it’s urgent to reverse this trend. The [objective] will be to accelerate the
calendar for the support of the force, and the operational calendar.33
In the closing weeks of December, Macron remarked that he wanted the force
to book its ﬁrst signiﬁcant victories against Islamist militants by mid-2018,
both to prove its worth and ensure ﬁnancial support from the United
Nations and the United States.34
Niger: fighters from Mali attack Niger, US forces
On 4 October 2017, troops from Niger and US forces were ambushed in the
town of Tongo Tongo in Niger, near the border with Mali. Approximately 50
attackers, allegedly coming from Mali, used machine guns and rocket-pro-
pelled grenades to kill four US and four Niger soldiers and to wound
several others. French troops who were present in the region were asked to
support a counterattack.35 Months after the attack, responsibility for it was
claimed by IS.36
Initially the US announced that only three of its soldiers had been killed,
the fourth body was found two days after the attack.37 A month later, the
US and Niger still did not agree on the sequence of events or the nature of
the mission.38 The US Department of Defense was heavily criticised in the
US Congress for inadequately providing information on the event.39
33‘France invites U.S. to Dec. 13 summit on boosting fight against W. African militants’, Reuters (30 Novem-
ber 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-france-sahel/france-invites-u-s-to-dec-13-summit-on-
boosting-fight-against-w-african-militants-idUSKBN1DU27X.
34Marine Pennetier and John Irish, ‘“Sahel coalition” wants victories against Islamist militants by mid-2018’,
Reuters (13 December 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-security-sahel/sahel-coalition-wants-
victories-against-islamist-militants-by-mid-2018-idUSKBN1E70FQ.
35Boureima Balima, ‘French, Nigerien forces operating where three U.S. soldiers killed’, Reuters (5 October
2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-usa/french-nigerien-forces-operating-where-three-u-s-soldiers-
killed-idUSKBN1CA14K.
36‘Islamic State affiliate claims deadly attack on U.S. troops in Niger’, Reuters (13 January 2018) www.
reuters.com/article/us-niger-security/islamic-state-affiliate-claims-deadly-attack-on-u-s-troops-in-niger-
idUSKBN1F20L3.
37Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, ‘Pentagon says fourth U.S. soldier killed in Niger ambush’, Reuters (6 October
2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-usa/pentagon-says-fourth-u-s-soldier-killed-in-niger-ambush-
idUSKBN1CB2IL.
38Tim Cocks and Idrees Ali, ‘A month on, U.S., Niger still disagree on what happened on fatal mission’,
Reuters (3 November 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-usa-security/a-month-on-u-s-niger-still-
disagree-on-what-happened-on-fatal-mission-idUSKBN1D31VH.
39Idrees Ali, ‘Top U.S. military officer seeks to address criticism of fatal Niger operation’, Reuters (23 October
2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-usa/top-u-s-military-officer-seeks-to-address-criticism-of-fatal-
niger-operation-idUSKBN1CS2O6.
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Two months after the deadly attack, the government of Niger gave the US
permission to use its capital Niamy as a base for armed drone attacks in Niger
and, possibly, in neighbouring countries.40 According to the US department
of Defense, ‘the government of Niger and the US stand firm in working
together to prevent terrorist organizations from using the region as a safe
haven.’41 In order to assist the operation of the drones, an 800-strong US
force working on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance was sent to
Niger.42
Nigeria – Niger – Cameroon – Chad: Boko Haram attacks and
responses
During the reporting period, the Nigerian-based Islamist militant group Boko
Haram continued to carry out numerous attacks in Nigeria, and, albeit less
frequently than before,43 in neighbouring countries Cameroon, Chad and
Niger. Thus, on 3 July 2017, Boko Haram militants reportedly killed nine
people and abducted dozens more in the village of Ngalewa, southern
Niger.44 Most Boko Haram attacks outside Nigeria occurred in northern
Cameroon. On 6 August, a suicide bomber killed at least seven people in a
town in northern Cameroon.45 In the same border region with Nigeria, 15
people were killed and eight taken hostage in a suspected Boko Haram
attack with automatic fire.46 On 13 September, a girl strapped with a bomb,
a technique frequently used by Boko Haram, caused an explosion in a
mosque, killing five men.47 On 30 October, suspected Boko Haram
members killed over 10 villagers in northern Cameroon.48
40Helen Cooper and Eric Schmitt, ‘Niger Approves Armed U.S. Drone Flights, Expanding Pentagon’s Role in
Africa’, New York Times (30 November 2017) www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/us/politics/pentagon-niger-
drones.html.
41Ibid.
42‘Niger approves use of armed American drones: U.S. official’, Reuters (30 November 2017) www.reuters.
com/article/us-niger-usa-military/niger-approves-use-of-armed-american-drones-u-s-official-
idUSKBN1DU327.
43Under Secretary-General Feltman noted in September that ‘[w]ithout question, Boko Haram’s combat
capacity has diminished, but to compensate for that, Boko Haram has changed tactics by increasing
the use of suicide attacks.’ UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8047 (13 September 2017) 2/22.
44‘Suspected Boko Haram militants kill nine, abduct dozens in Niger’, Reuters (3 July 2017) www.reuters.
com/article/us-nigeria-security-niger/suspected-boko-haram-militants-kill-nine-abduct-dozens-in-niger-
idUSKBN19O0Y1.
45‘Suicide bomber kills seven in northern Cameroon’, Reuters (6 August 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-
nigeria-security/suicide-bomber-kills-seven-in-northern-cameroon-idUSKBN1AM0CB.
46‘Suspected Boko Haram militants kill 15 in Cameroon’, Reuters (25 August 2017) www.reuters.com/
article/us-nigeria-security-cameroon/suspected-boko-haram-militants-kill-15-in-cameroon-
idUSKCN1B51TC.
47Josiane Kouagheu, ‘Girl strapped with bomb kills five in Cameroon mosque’, Reuters (13 September
2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-cameroon/girl-strapped-with-bomb-kills-five-in-
cameroon-mosque-idUSKCN1BO22C.
48‘Suspected Boko Haram raid kills at least 10 in Cameroon village’, Reuters (30 October 2017) www.
reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-cameroon/suspected-boko-haram-raid-kills-at-least-10-in-
cameroon-village-idUSKBN1CZ1FZ.
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In the beginning of October, Chad withdrew hundreds of its troops from
Niger, where they were helping Niger forces in the fight against Boko
Haram.49 As a result of the Chadian withdrawal, Niger’s Diffa region saw
an increase of attacks by Boko Haram militants crossing the border from
Nigeria.50
On 20 December, it was reported that Cameroonian armed forces had
crossed the border with Nigeria while chasing Boko Haram militants twice
that month, without seeking authorisation from Nigeria.51 An anonymous
Cameroonian official stated that they did not want to let the militants
move and attack across the border ‘without being troubled’.52 The Cameroo-
nian soldiers left Nigeria after being requested to do so by Nigerian security
forces. A Nigerian military source said that his country was ‘not for war
but keeping peace and protecting [its] territorial integrity’.53 The facts were
not officially confirmed.
Towards the end of the year, the US agreed to what it called ‘a transaction
supporting Nigeria’s efforts to fight Boko Haram’, involving the sale of 12
Super Tucano A-29 planes and weapons to Nigeria for a total amount of
593 million USD.54
Central African Republic – Cameroon: spill-over of violence
During the UN General Assembly meeting in September 2017, Central
African Republic (CAR) President Touadera called for an increase in the mili-
tary means of the UN Multinational Integrated Stabilization Mission in the
CAR and an expansion of its mandate to the reestablishment of control
over natural resources, in order to curb the ‘increased security risks related
to violence imposed by armed groups’.55 A week later, Cameroon sealed its
border with the CAR after several of its citizens had been kidnapped and
49Boureima Balima and Emma Farge, ‘Chad withdraws troops from fight against Boko Haram in Niger’,
Reuters (12 October 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-security-chad/chad-withdraws-troops-
from-fight-against-boko-haram-in-niger-idUSKBN1CH2T0.
50Ibid. Chad did not provide a reason for the withdrawal, but earlier it had warned that its security com-
mitments would be affected by the US travel ban against Chadian nationals.
51Paul Carsten and Aaron Ross, ‘Exclusive: Cameroonian troops entered Nigeria without seeking authoriz-
ation, sources in Nigeria say’, Reuters (20 December 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-cameroon-
separatists-nigeria/exclusive-cameroonian-troops-entered-nigeria-without-seeking-authorization-
sources-in-nigeria-say-idUSKBN1EE2II.
52Ibid.
53Ibid.
54‘Nigeria says U.S. agrees delayed $593 million fighter plane sale’, Reuters (27 December 2017) www.
reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-usa/nigeria-says-u-s-agrees-delayed-593-million-fighter-plane-sale-
idUSKBN1EL1EN.
55Translated from French. See CAR, ‘Discours de son excellence monsieur le president de la Republique,
chef de l’etat, le Professeur Faustin Archange Touadera, à l’occasion de la 72ème Assemblée Génerale de
l’ONU’, New York (22 September 2017).
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taken into the CAR by armed groups.56 Three of the victims were reportedly
freed after cross-border fighting between Cameroonian soldiers and the
rebels.57
Uganda – Democratic Republic of Congo: cross-border operation
against ADF rebels
On 8 December 2017, a base of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo
(MONUSCO) was attacked by members of the Armed Defence Forces (ADF),
an Ugandan-based rebel group.58 The attack killed five Congolese soldiers and
15 Tanzanian peacekeepers, wounding another 53 peacekeepers and was con-
demned by the Security Council.59 In response to the attack, representatives of
the Ugandan and DRC armies announced a ‘coordinated operation’, clarify-
ing they did not envisage Ugandan troops crossing over into Congolese terri-
tory.60 This changed when on 22 December, the Ugandan armed forces
carried out an attack against a rebel group on Congolese territory, after
having received intelligence by the DRC. The attack was referred to by a
DRC’s spokesman as ‘a pre-emptive move’.61
South Sudan – Uganda: cross-border activities
In early July 2017, it was reported that several men wearing South-Sudanese
military uniforms had carried out cross-border raids on villages in Uganda in
the course of June, stealing cattle and trying to seize refugees.62 The Ugandan
military confirmed the raids, yet without clarifying who carried them out.
South Sudan denied any involvement in the attacks.63
On 17 August 2017, armed Ugandan civilians were reported to have briefly
abducted the spokesman of a South Sudanese rebel group, Lam Paul Gabriel,
56Moki Edwin Kindzeka, ‘Cameroon Seals Border as Fresh Violence Escalates in CAR’, VOA (28 September
2017) www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-seals-border-car/4047965.html.
57Ibid.
58Fiston Mahambla, ‘Congo and Uganda to launch joint operation against rebel ADF’, Reuters (20 Decem-
ber 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-violence-uganda/congo-and-uganda-to-launch-joint-
operation-against-rebel-adf-idUSKBN1EE2QG.
59UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8129 (8 December 2017) 1/11. A similar attack by the ADF against a
MONUSCO base took place on 9 October, killing two Tanzanian peacekeepers. See ‘MONUSCO repels
deadly attack by suspected ADF in Mamundioma; Reinforcements deployed to secure the location’ (9
October 2017) https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/monusco-repels-deadly-attack-suspected-adf-
mamundioma-reinforcements-deployed-secure-location.
60Mahambla (n 58).
61‘Ugandan army attacks rebel camps in eastern Congo’, Reuters (22 December 2017) www.reuters.com/
article/us-uganda-military-congo/ugandan-army-attacks-rebel-camps-in-eastern-congo-
idUSKBN1EG1EK.
62Elias Biryabarema, ‘Raids on Uganda show South Sudan’s war spilling across its borders’, Reuters (3 July
2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-southsudan-violence/raids-on-uganda-show-south-sudans-
war-spilling-across-its-borders-idUSKBN19O1JX.
63Ibid.
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from his home near the border with South Sudan, demanding him to stop
speaking with the media.64 Gabriel accused South Sudan of being behind
the events, an allegation that was denied by both Uganda and South
Sudan.65 Two weeks later, the same rebel spokesman announced that soldiers
from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) had crossed the border with
Uganda and entered the Ugandan towns of Moyo and Koboko.66 The SPLA
presence in Uganda was confirmed by eye witnesses, yet denied by the
Ugandan military.67
Also in August, the troops of the Regional Protection Force (RPF) of the
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)68 gradually arrived in the country,
starting with a first detachment of 120 Rwandan peacekeepers.69
Somalia – Kenya: Al-Shabaab attacks and responses
In Somalia, the fight against the radical Islamist al-Shabaab militia continued
throughout the second half of 2017. On 30 July, for instance, 23 soldiers of the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and one Somali soldier died in
heavy fighting with al-Shabaab militants in the Lower Shabelle region.70 In
order to strengthen the Somali armed forces, Turkey opened a military base
in Somalia’s capital Mogadishu, with a capacity to train 10,000 Somali
soldiers.71
US air strikes and ground operations in Somalia
On 4 July 2017, the US conducted what it called a ‘collective self-defense strike
operation against an al-Shabaab troop concentration’,72 300 miles southwest
of Mogadishu, Somalia. No further information on the trigger for this attack
64Jason Patinkin, ‘Armed group in Uganda briefly abduct South Sudanese rebel, he says’, Reuters (19
August 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-uganda/armed-group-in-uganda-briefly-abduct-
south-sudanese-rebel-he-says-idUSKCN1AZ0K2.
65Ibid.
66Elias Biryabarema, ‘Rebels say South Sudan’s use of Uganda territory could spread instability’, Reuters (30
August 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-uganda/rebels-say-south-sudans-use-of-uganda-
territory-could-spread-instability-idUSKCN1BA216.
67Ibid.
68For an overview of the debate to increase the troops of the RPF, see Tom Ruys, Luca Ferro, Nele Verlin-
den and Carl Vander Maelen (eds), ‘Digest of State Practice: 1 July – 31 December 2016’ (2017) 4 Journal
on the Use of Force and International Law 161, 168–70.
69‘Rwandan Soldiers Arrive in South Sudan Ahead of Thousands More Extra UN Troops’, VOA (8 August
2017) www.voanews.com/a/rwandan-soldiers-arrive-in-south-sudan-ahead-of-thousands-more-extra-
un-troops/3977062.html.
70‘Twenty-four killed in fighting between Somali, AU troops and al Shabaab, officials say’, Reuters (30 July
2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-attacks-official/twenty-four-killed-in-fighting-between-
somali-au-troops-and-al-shabaab-official-says-idUSKBN1AF0QG.
71Abdirahman Hussein and Orhan Coskun, ‘Turkey opens military base in Mogadishu to train Somali sol-
diers’, Reuters (30 September 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-turkey-military/turkey-opens-
military-base-in-mogadishu-to-train-somali-soldiers-idUSKCN1C50JH.
72US, US Africa Command, ‘U.S. strikes al-Shabaab fighters in Somalia’, Public Affairs, Stuttgard, Germany, 5
July 2017, www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/29725/u-s-strikes-al-shabaab-fighters-in-somalia.
See also ‘U.S. strikes al Shabaab militants in Somalia: Pentagon’, Reuters (5 July 2017) www.reuters.
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was provided, apart from a general statement by the US African Command
(‘Africom’) that ‘Al-Shabaab has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and is dedi-
cated to providing safe haven for terrorist attacks throughout the world.’73
Another ‘self-defense’ air strike was launched when Somali troops,
accompanied by US advisers, came under direct Al-Shabaab attack in Jilib,
on 17 August.74
In line with the new parameters approved by President Trump in March
2017,75 the US also conducted several other strikes. On 30 July, the US assisted
Somali forces in a raid against al-Shabaab, killing Ali Mohamed Hussein, a
senior Al-Shabaab member.76 The killing was later confirmed by al-
Qaeda.77 According to US Africom, the attack was ‘a direct response to al
Shabaab actions, including recent attacks on Somali forces.’78 US Africom
reported similar strikes in August,79 September,80 November81 and Decem-
ber.82 The largest attack was carried out on 21 November in support of a
Somali ground offensive83 and killed over a hundred al-Shabaab militants.
com/article/us-usa-somalia-pentagon/u-s-strikes-al-shabaab-militants-in-somalia-pentagon-
idUSKBN19Q2DD.
73Ibid.
74Ryan Browne, ‘US troops call in airstrike after they come under fire in Somalia’, CNN (17 August 2017)
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/17/politics/us-troops-somalia-airstrike/index.html.
75Declaring some zones of Somalia ‘areas of active hostilities’, allowing for offensive strikes in addition to
defensive ones. See previous Digest: Tom Ruys, Luca Ferro and Carl Vander Maelen (eds), ‘Digest of state
practice: 1 January – 30 June 2017’ (2017) 4 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 371, 386.
76‘U.S. says took part in Somali raid that killed al Shabaab commander’, Reuters (4 August 2017) www.
reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security/u-s-says-took-part-in-somalia-raid-that-killed-al-shabaab-
commander-idUSKBN1AK19F.
77‘Al Qaeda says senior commander in Somalia al Shabaab affiliate killed’, Reuters (26 August 2017) www.
reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security/al-qaeda-says-senior-commander-in-somalia-al-shabaab-
affiliate-killed-idUSKCN1B60PD.
78US, US AFRICA COMMAND, ‘U.S. confirms strike against al-Shabaab’s Ali Jabal’, Public Affairs, Stuttgart,
Germany, 4 August 2017, www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/29788/u-s-confirms-strike-
against-al-shabaabs-ali-jabal.
79US, US AFRICA COMMAND, ‘U.S. strikes against al-Shabaab’, Stuttgart, Germany, 10 August 2017, www.
africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/29802/u-s-strikes-against-al-shabaab and a similar press release
on 17 August.
80US, US AFRICA COMMAND, ‘U.S. Conducts Airstrike in Support of the Federal Government of Somalia’,
Stuttgart, Germany, 6 September 2017, www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/29886/u-s-
conducts-airstrike-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia and similar press releases on 8
and 13 September.
81US, US AFRICA COMMAND, ‘U.S. Conducts Airstrike in Support of the Federal Government of Somalia’,
Stuttgart, Germany, 9 November 2017, www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/30074/u-s-
conducts-airstrike-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia and similar press releases on 12,
15 and 21 November.
82US, US AFRICA COMMAND, ‘U.S. Conducts Airstrike in Support of the Federal Government of Somalia’,
Stuttgart, Germany, 12 December 2017, www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/30188/u-s-
conducts-airstrike-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia and similar press releases on 18,
27 and 28 December. Another air strike was reported on 6 December, but remained unconfirmed by
US Africom. ‘Air strike reported near Somalia’s capital, official says Shabaab targeted’, Reuters (6 Decem-
ber 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security/air-strike-reported-near-somalias-capital-official-
says-shabaab-targeted-idUSKBN1E0283.
83Abdi Sheikh, ‘Somalia says it requested U.S. air strike that killed 100 militants’, Reuters (22 November
2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-somalia/somalia-says-it-requested-u-s-air-strike-that-
killed-100-militants-idUSKBN1DM1FP.
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On each occasion, the US stated that ‘U.S. forces will continue to use all auth-
orized and appropriate measures to protect Americans and to disable terrorist
threats.’84
In addition to the abovementioned air strikes, the US was also involved in
ground operations against al-Shabaab. Such participation was only revealed
after an offensive on 25 November 2017 allegedly led to the killing of 10 civi-
lians, including three children.85 In spite of media reports revealed ‘strong evi-
dence’ of US involvement in civilian casualties,86 US Africom concluded after
an investigation that ‘the only casualties were those of armed enemy comba-
tants’.87 In mid-December, however, US Africom announced that a new
investigation would be opened in order ‘to ensure a full exploration of the
facts given the gravity of the allegations’.88
US attacks against IS in Somalia
According to a UN Report, the presence of IS militants in Somalia increased
from a few dozen in 2016 up to 200 in 2017.89 Shortly after an Uzbek immi-
grant inspired by the Islamic State ploughed a truck into pedestrians and
cyclists in New York City, killing eight,90 President Trump announced that
the US would hit IS ‘10 times harder’.91 On 3 and 27 November, the US
carried out air strikes against members of IS in north-eastern Somalia, alleg-
edly killing several terrorists.92 Shortly after the first strike, the US ordered all
84See references to US Africom press releases above.
85Adbi Seikh, ‘U.S. forces in Somalia raid; three children reported among dead’, Reuters (25 August 2017)
www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security/u-s-forces-in-somalia-raid-three-children-reported-
among-dead-idUSKCN1B523H.
86See Christina Goldbaum, ‘Strong Evidence that U.S. Special Operations Forces Massacred Civilians in
Somalia’, The Daily Beast (29 November 2017) www.thedailybeast.com/strong-evidence-that-us-
special-operations-forces-massacred-civilians-in-somalia.
87US, US AFRICA COMMAND, ‘Aug. 25 civilian casualty allegation assessment result released’, Stuttgart,
Germany, 29 November 2017, www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/30134/aug-25-civilian-
casualty-allegation-assessment-results-released.
88Elizabeth McLaughlin and Luis Martinez, ‘US military orders new investigation after report that special
operations killed Somali civilians’, ABC News (14 December 2017) http://abcnews.go.com/International/
us-military-orders-investigation-report-army-special-forces/story?id=51788736.
89Katharine Houreld, ‘Islamic State’s footprint spreading in northern Somalia: U.N.’, Reuters (8 November
2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-islamic-state/islamic-states-footprint-spreading-in-northern-
somalia-u-n-idUSKBN1D828Z.
90Devlin Barrett, Matt Zapotosky and Mark Berman, ‘New York truck attack suspect charged with terrorism
offense as Trump calls for a death sentence’,Washington Post (2 November 2017) www.washingtonpost.
com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/11/01/new-york-attack-probe-expands-to-uzbekistan-as-possible-
militant-links-explored/?utm_term=.74f844ea09c6. Although White House press secretary Sarah Huck-
abee Sanders said that ‘I believe we would consider this person to be an enemy combatant’ and US
President Trump said he was considering sending Saipov to the Guantanamo Bay detention facility,
the attacker (Sayfullo Saipov) was charged with crimes in a US civilian court.
91‘New York attack: Trump vows to ‘hit IS 10 times harder’, BBC News (3 November 2017) www.bbc.com/
news/world-us-canada-41860808.
92US, US AFRICA COMMAND, ‘U.S. conducts airstrikes against ISIS in Somalia’, Stuttgart, Germany, 3
November 2017, www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/30046/u-s-conducts-airstrikes-against-isis-
in-somalia; ‘U.S. carries out first strikes against Islamic State in Somalia’, Reuters (3 November 2017)
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-somalia-military/u-s-carries-out-first-strikes-against-islamic-state-in-
somalia-idUSKBN1D323S; US, US AFRICA COMMAND, ‘U.S. Conducts Airstrike in Support of the Federal
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of its non-essential diplomatic staff to leave the Somali capital of Mogadishu,
saying it received a ‘specific threat’ against its personnel.93
Kenya: al-Shabaab attacks and response
Al-Shabaab militants killed at least three Kenyan police officers during a raid
on a border village in the northeast of Kenya on 5 July 2017.94 Two days later,
al-Shabaab reportedly beheaded nine civilians in an attack on the village of
Jima in southeastern Kenya.95 In response, the Kenyan Defence Force
launched retaliatory airstrikes against an al-Shabaab base in the Boni forest,
near the Somali border.96 On 13 July, a senior Kenyan government official
was reportedly taken hostage by al-Shabaab together with five others, in the
coastal district of Lamu. Two hostages were killed during the army-led
rescue operation.97 One month later, another five Kenyan policemen were
killed in a suspected al-Shabaab ambush in Garissa County.98 On 18
August, al-Shabaab members beheaded three civilians in Maleli, Lamu
County.99 In the same county, four men were beheaded by al-Shabaab mili-
tants in two attacks on 6 September. On 3 September, another three
Kenyan policemen were reportedly killed by alleged al-Shabaab members in
the south of Mombasa.100
Government of Somalia’, Stuttgart, Germany, 27 November 2017, www.africom.mil/media-room/
pressrelease/30119/u-s-conducts-airstrike-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia; ‘U.S. mili-
tary says conducted air strike against ISIS in Somalia’, Reuters (27 November 2017) www.reuters.com/
article/us-somalia-security/u-s-military-says-conducted-air-strike-against-isis-in-somalia-
idUSKBN1DR2DD.
93‘U.S. warns of threat to diplomatic staff in Somali capital’, Reuters (4 November 2017) www.reuters.com/
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al shabaab attackers kill three in Kenya’s Lamu: official’, Reuters (18 August 2017) www.reuters.com/
article/us-kenya-attacks/suspected-al-shabaab-attackers-kill-three-in-kenyas-lamu-official-
idUSKCN1AY0VJ; Joseph Akwiri, ‘Suspected al Shabaab militants behead four in Kenya’s Lamu County:
official’, Reuters (6 September 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-security/suspected-al-shabaab-
militants-behead-four-in-kenyas-lamu-county-official-idUSKCN1BH1BY.
96Joseph Akwiri, ‘Kenyan military says it launches strikes against al Shabaab forest base’, Reuters (10 July
2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-violence/kenyan-military-says-it-launches-strikes-against-al-
shabaab-forest-base-idUSKBN19V1WG.
97‘Two killed in hostage rescue operation after militant attack in Kenya’, Reuters (13 July 2017) www.
reuters.com/article/us-kenya-violence/two-killed-in-hostage-rescue-operation-after-militant-attack-in-
kenya-idUSKBN19Y272.
98Humphrey Malalo, ‘Suspected Somali militants kill five Kenyan police officers: sources’, Reuters (15
August 2017), www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-attacks/suspected-somali-militants-kill-five-kenyan-
police-officers-sources-idUSKCN1AV1S3.
99‘Suspected al-Shabab attackers behead 3 in Kenya’s Lamu’, Al Jazeera (18 August 2017) www.aljazeera.
com/news/2017/08/suspected-al-shabab-attackers-behead-3-kenya-lamu-170818100001888.html.
100Joseph Akwiri, ‘Gunmen kill two policemen at church on Kenya’s coast’, Reuters (3 September 2017)
www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-security/gunmen-kill-two-policemen-at-church-on-kenyas-coast-
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Djibouti: Chinese troops arrive at military naval base
On 12 July 2017, China started shipping its military personnel to Djibouti,
where it had begun constructing its first overseas military naval base the
year before.101 According to the State news agency Xinhua, the base would
be used for ‘escorting, peace-keeping and humanitarian aid in Africa and
west Asia’, as well as for ‘military cooperation, joint exercises, evacuating
and protecting overseas Chinese and emergency rescue’ and ‘jointly maintain-
ing security of international strategic seaways.’102 Chinese President Xi asked
the troops to ‘promote international and regional peace and stability’.103
3. Middle East
Iraq: government declares victory over IS; Kurdish referendum
triggers military response from Iraq and Turkey
Following a nine-month offensive by Iraqi forces, backed by air support from
US-led coalition forces participating in Operation Inherent Resolve, the Iraqi
authorities succeeded in retaking the city of Mosul from the so-called ‘Islamic
State’ (IS, ISIS, ISIL, also known as Da’esh) in mid-2017.104 On 9 July 2017,
Iraqi Prime Minister al-Abadi visited the city and declared victory over
IS.105 While the offensive resulted in heavy suffering of, and casualties
among, the population of Mosul – with Amnesty International accusing
pro-government and coalition forces of disproportionate military attacks106
101Ben Blanchard, ‘China sends troops to open first overseas military base in Djibouti’, Reuters (12 July
2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-china-djibouti/china-sends-troops-to-open-first-overseas-military-
base-in-djibouti-idUSKBN19X049.
102Ibid.
103‘Promote peace, China’s Xi tells soldiers at first overseas base’, Reuters (4 November 2017) www.reuters.
com/article/us-china-defence/promote-peace-chinas-xi-tells-soldiers-at-first-overseas-base-
idUSKBN1D401U.
104Khaled al-Ramahi and Maher Chmaytelli, ‘Iraq declares end of caliphate after capture of Mosul mosque’,
Reuters (29 June 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul/iraq-declares-end-of-
caliphate-after-capture-of-mosul-mosque-idUSKBN19K0YZ; ‘Iraq army seizes ruins of Mosul mosque
from ISIL’, Al Jazeera (29 June 2017) www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/iraq-army-seizes-ruins-mosul-
mosque-isil-170629101924765.html.
105Tim Arango and Michael R Gordon, ‘Iraqi Prime Minister arrives in Mosul to declare victory over ISIS’,
New York Times (9 July 2017) www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/world/middleeast/mosul-isis-liberated.
html.
106Amnesty International, ‘“At Any Cost” – The Civilian Catastrophe in West Mosul, Iraq’ (11 July 2017)
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/07/at-any-cost-civilian-catastrophe-in-west-mosul-iraq/
(‘Pro-government forces relied heavily upon explosive weapons with wide area effects such as IRAMs
(Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions)… The use of unsuitable weapons or failure to take other
necessary precautions resulted in needless loss of civilian lives and in some cases appears to have con-
stituted disproportionate attacks.… Between 19 February and 19 June 2017, attacks launched by Iraqi
and coalition forces may have caused the deaths of as many as 5,805 civilians.’). It should be noted that
Lt. Gen Stephen Townsend, then-commander of the Combined Joint Task Force of Operation Inherent
Resolve, rejected ‘any notion that coalition fires were in any way imprecise, unlawful or excessively tar-
geted civilians’. See Ellen Mitchell, ‘Top US general denies claim of possible war crimes in Mosul fight’,
The Hill (11 July 2017) www.thehill.com/policy/defense/341539-us-commander-denies-reports-of-
possible-coalition-war-crimes-in-mosul-fight. In a similar vein: United States of America, Department
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– the retaking of Mosul dealt a heavy blow to IS. Mosul was the largest city in
either Iraq or Syria held by the group. It was also the place where IS-leader al-
Baghdadi declared himself the leader of an Islamic ‘caliphate’ in 2014.
The victory over IS did not, however, succeed in bringing peace and stab-
ility to Iraq. In particular, September saw the tension concerning the push
for Kurdish independence come to a head, as both Turkish forces (which
had previously been embroiled in escalating clashes with the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK)) and Iraqi forces sought to quell the movement.
Thus, when the regional authorities in Iraq’s Kurdish region announced
an independence referendum to take place on 25 September 2017,
Turkish soldiers started conducting military drills along the Turkish-Iraqi
border in a show of strength from mid-September onwards. The Turkish
army also started carrying out airstrikes in the Iraqi Zab region on PKK pos-
itions. Scores of militants were killed in the process,107 as were several
Turkish forces.108
Regardless, the referendum took place and reportedly resulted in over 92%
of the Iraqi Kurds voting in favour of independence.109 The results were
swiftly condemned by both the Turkish and Iraqi government. Turkish pre-
sident Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated: ‘Our armed forces are on the borders
with Iraq to do whatever it takes.… Irrespective of the result, we see this
[referendum] as null and void and say it is illegitimate’.110
On 15 October, the Iraqi government accused Kurdish authorities of bring-
ing PKK militants to Kirkuk, and characterised the move as a ‘declaration of
war’.111 The day after, almost three weeks after the referendum, Iraqi forces
launched a large-scale military operation to capture the Kurdish held-city
of Defense, ‘Secretary Mattis Media Availability with General Townsend and Special Envoy McGurk’ (22
August 2017) www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1286209/secretary-mattis-
media-availability-with-general-townsend-and-special-envoy-mcg/. See also Samuel Oakford, ‘The U.S.
Is in Denial about the Civilians It’s Killing in Syria’, Foreign Policy (31 August 2017) www.
foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/31/the-u-s-is-in-denial-about-the-civilians-its-killing-in-syria/; Human Rights
Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’
(8 August 2017).
107‘Turkish warplanes kill three Kurdish militants in northern Iraq – army’, Reuters (19 September 2017)
www.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-security-iraq/turkish-warplanes-kill-three-kurdish-militants-in-
northern-iraq-army-idUKKCN1BU2A5; ‘Turkish jets destroy PKK hideouts in northern Iraq’, Hürriyet Daily
News (24 September 2017) www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-jets-destroy-pkk-hideouts-in-northern-
iraq---118320.
108‘Four Turkish security personnel killed in anti-PKK operation’, The New Arab (30 September 2017) www.
alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/9/30/four-turkish-security-personnel-killed-in-anti-pkk-operation.
109Martin Chulov, ‘More than 92% of voters in Iraqi Kurdistan back independence’, The Guardian (28 Sep-
tember 2017) www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/27/over-92-of-iraqs-kurds-vote-for-
independence.
110‘Erdogan warns of armed action over Kurdish referendum’, Al Jazeera (25 September 2017) www.
aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/erdogan-warns-armed-action-iraqi-kurdistan-vote-170925142445627.
html.
111‘Iraq says Kurds have brought in PKK fighters in “declaration of war”’, Reuters (15 October 2017) www.
reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-kirkuk/iraq-says-kurds-have-brought-in-pkk-fighters-in-
declaration-of-war-idUKKBN1CK0Q1.
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of Kirkuk.112 Iraqi government forces regained control over the city on 20
October, albeit that scattered border clashes continued to occur in subsequent
days.113 Meanwhile, Turkish forces also clashed with Kurdish fighters within
Syria (see infra).
Syrian civil war rages on: third-State involvement and spill-over
effects
Overview
After Syria’s extremely turbulent first half of 2017,114 the situation in the war-
torn country did not stabilise in the second half of the year. Although Raqqa
was taken back from IS and some headway was made as to the establishment
and enforcement of de-escalation areas, dozens of incidents nonetheless took
place involving Russia, the Syrian government forces, Israel, the US-backed
coalition, and Turkey.
Declarations of ‘victory’ over IS
Echoing the declaration of victory over IS by the Iraqi authorities follow-
ing the recapture of Mosul (see supra), the second half of 2017 saw impor-
tant successes in the fight against IS within Syria. In particular, on 20
October, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an alliance of Kurdish
and Arab militias backed by the United States of America, declared the
‘total liberation’ of Raqqa, which had been the stronghold of IS for
several years.115 Seizing Raqqa was seen as a near-mortal blow to IS,
and led to a fierce push of the other parties to drive the terrorist organis-
ation out of its final bastions. Three weeks later, Syrian government forces
announced victory in the fight against IS upon retaking Albu Kamal, the
last town held by the militant group in Syria. The Syrian army brushed off
small pockets of resistance it still encountered in the desert area as
negligible.116
112Saeed Kamali Dehghan et al., ‘Iraqi forces claim rapid progress in operation to “impose security” on
Kirkuk’, The Guardian (16 October 2017) www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/16/iraqi-army-
advances-kirkuk-kurds.
113David Zucchino, ‘Enmity Between Baghdad and Kurds Erupts in Deadly Clashes’, New York Times (24
October 2017) www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/world/middleeast/iraqi-kurds-clashes-abadi.html?rref=
collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=
rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront.
114See Ruys, Ferro and Vander Maelen (eds) (n 75) 388–402.
115Arwa Damon et al., ‘Raqqa: US-backed forces declare “total liberation” of ISIS stronghold’, CNN (20
October 2017) www.edition.cnn.com/2017/10/20/middleeast/raqqa-syria-isis-total-liberation/index.
html.
116Angus McDowall and Sarah Dadouch, ‘Syria declares victory over Islamic State’, Reuters (9 November
2017) www.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-islamic-state/syria-declares-victory-over-islamic-state-
idUKKBN1D91R7.
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The victory chorus was joined in early December by Russian president
Putin117 (as well as Turkey and Iran in a joint statement)118 and led him to
order the Russian military to begin withdrawing from Syria. However,
Russia later said it would keep a naval and an air base in Syria, capable of car-
rying out strikes against ‘terrorists’ if required.119
Peace negotiations and de-escalation areas
Although a general ceasefire for the conflict in Syria could not be reached, July
2017 nevertheless started promisingly when the US, Russia and Jordan agreed
to a truce in the southwest of the country. The ceasefire covered the provinces
Deraa, Suweida and Quneitra and seemed aimed at preventing a spillover of
violence to Jordan in the South and Israel in the West.120 United States
National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster called the agreement an important
step in striving to ‘defeating ISIS, helping to end the conflict in Syria [and]
reducing suffering’.121 The Iranian foreign ministry spokesman was more
critical and said that:
The agreement can be fruitful if it is expanded to all of Syria and includes all the
area that we discussed in Astana talks for de-escalating the tension.… Iran is
seeking Syria’s sovereignty and security so a ceasefire cannot be limited to a
certain location…No agreement would be successful without taking the reali-
ties on the ground into account.122
Several weeks later, Iran reached an agreement with Russia and Turkey during
the sixth round of Syrian peace negotiations in Astana to establish ceaseﬁre
zones (or ‘de-escalation areas’, as the agreement calls them). The agreement
stipulated that it created such areas
117‘Putin declares “complete victory” on both banks of Euphrates in Syria’, Reuters (6 December 2017)
www.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-putin/putin-declares-complete-victory-on-both-banks-
of-euphrates-in-syria-idUKKBN1E028G.
118Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Joint statement by Iran, Russia and Turkey on the Inter-
national Meeting on Syria in Astana, 21–22 December 2017’ (22 December 2017) www.mfa.gov.tr/
astanada-duzenlenen-suriye-konulu-uluslararasi-toplanti-hk-ortak-aciklama_en.en.mfa.
119Denis Pinchuk, ‘Russia will keep bases in Syria to strike at insurgents – Kremlin’, Reuters (12 December
2017) www.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-withdrawa/russia-will-keep-bases-in-syria-
to-strike-at-insurgents-kremlin-idUKKBN1E610E. It should be noted that Russia is also believed to
have incentivized private security contractors to join the conflict in Syria by explicitly announcing in
July that oil and mining rights would be awarded to corporate actors if they managed to clear Syrian
territory from ISIL. Andrew E Kramer, ‘Russia Deploys a Potent Weapon in Syria: The Profit Motive’,
New York Times (5 July 2017) www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/middleeast/russia-syria-oil-isis.
html. Two Russian companies believed to benefit from the policy – which was arranged with the
Syrian government – are Evro Polis and Stroytransgaz.
120‘Ceasefire goes into effect in Deraa, Suweida, Quneitra’, Al Jazeera (9 July 2017) www.aljazeera.com/
news/2017/07/syria-ceasefire-deraa-suweida-quneitra-170709074305852.html.
121Nicole Chavez and Tamara Qiblawi, ‘Ceasefire brokered by US and Russia begins in Syria’, CNN (9 July
2017) www.edition.cnn.com/2017/07/09/middleeast/syria-ceasefire-begins/index.html.
122‘Iran: U.S.-Russia ceasefire deal should be expanded to cover all Syria’, Reuters (10 July 2017) www.
reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-iran/iran-u-s-russia-ceasefire-deal-should-be-expanded-to-
cover-all-syria-idUKKBN19V0QO.
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in eastern Ghouta, in certain parts in the north of Homs province, in Idlib pro-
vince and certain parts of the neighbouring provinces (Latakia, Hama and
Aleppo provinces) and also in certain parts of southern Syria (based on the
Russian Federation initiative as a Guarantor of the Astana process, with the
aim to ensure the ceasefire regime, territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab
Republic and continue fight against terrorism).123
The three countries reafﬁrmed their commitment to guaranteeing the cease-
ﬁre regime on two more occasions throughout the year.124 The eighth round
of the Geneva peace negotiations proved less successful.125
Responsibility for gas attack of 4 April 2017
The controversy surrounding the use of chemical weapons in Syria’s town
of Khan Sheikhoun on 4 April 2017126 refused to die down in the second
half of 2017. In a scathing report, the UN Independent International Com-
mission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic found convincing evidence
that the Syrian air force was responsible for conducting the devastating
sarin gas attack, and it labelled the deployment as the war crime of
‘using chemical weapons and indiscriminate attacks in a civilian inhabited
area’.127
The report largely echoed the previous findings in the sixth report of the
UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) (and reiterated in its
seventh report128), which also concluded that the Syrian government forces
were responsible for the gas attack.129
The Syrian government, for its part, strongly asserted that it ‘does not
possess any chemical weapons, strongly condemns the use of such weapons
in any place, for any purpose and under any pretext, and has never used
123Letter dated 18 September 2017 from the Permanent Representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
the Russian Federation and Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, UN Doc S/2017/790 (19 September 2017).
124Letter dated 22 November 2017 from the Permanent Representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Russian Federation and Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/72/
616–S/2017/987 (30 November 2017).
125See, e.g. Identical letters dated 17 December 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent
Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and
the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/1064 (18 December 2017) (complaining that nego-
tiating partners prevented ‘any constructive dialogue with the Syrian State by setting preconditions on
crucial issues’).
126For a detailed overview, see Ruys, Ferro and Vander Maelen (eds) (n 75) 396–402.
127Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian
Arab Republic’ (8 August 2017) 16.
128United Nations, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Joint Investigative
Mechanism, ‘Seventh report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United
Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, UN Doc S/2017/904 (26 October 2017).
129United Nations, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Joint Investigative
Mechanism, ‘Sixth report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations
Joint Investigative Mechanism’, UN Doc S/2017/552 (28 June 2017). The Joint Investigative Mechanism
is a joint UN Panel investigating the chemical weapons attacks in Syria.
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any toxic chemicals since the crisis began’,130 and repeated this message
several times throughout the remainder of the year.131
Repeated attempts to extend the mandate of the JIM established by resol-
ution 2235 (2015)132 were blocked as Russia vetoed draft Security Council res-
olutions on 24 October133 and again on 16 and 17 November 2017.134
Tension and incidents between US-led coalition forces, on the one hand,
and Syria and Russia, on the other hand
The coalition of States participating in Operation Inherent Resolve135 contin-
ued its operations in Syria in full force.136 The 29 August saw no less than 51
airstrikes conducted in one day, 46 of which occurred near Raqqa.137 A day
later, a precision airstrike was carried out, accompanied by a CENTCOM
statement that it would not permit militias to relocate: ‘The Coalition was
not a party to any agreement between the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Syrian
regime and ISIS. Russian and pro-regime counter-ISIS words ring hollow
when they cut deals with and allow terrorists to transit territory under their
control’.138 The coalition ‘cratered the road heading east between Hamaymah
and Abul Kamal to prevent the further transport of ISIS fighters to the border
area of our Iraqi partners,’ after which individual fighters and vehicles were
neutralised.139
130Identical letters dated 3 July 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian
Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Secur-
ity Council, UN Doc S/2017/570 (6 July 2017).
131Identical letters dated 27 November 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/991 (5 December 2017). See also: Identical letters dated 7 November
2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/935 (14 November
2017): strongly disagreeing with the JIM’s seventh report, and claiming that ‘because of the extreme
politicization of its mandate, the Mechanism did not apply the principle of innocent until proven
guilty’ and that ‘the report is contradictory and vague and that no convincing or irrefutable physical
evidence is available’.
132UNSC Res 2235, UN Doc S/RES/2235 (7 August 2015).
133UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8073 (24 October 2017) 4–5.
134On 16 November, Russia posed its tenth veto concerning the situation in Syria by blocking draft resol-
ution S/2017/962. A Russian draft resolution similarly failed to pass, having received only four votes in
favour, seven against, and four abstentions. See UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8105 (16 Novem-
ber 2017). A day later, Russia vetoed draft resolution S/2017/970, which was the final bid to renew the
mandate of JIM for one month until a compromise could be reached. UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/
PV.8107 (17 November 2017).
135For the coalition’s official website, see www.inherentresolve.mil/. For additional information and regular
updates, see the website of US Central Command, www.centcom.mil/.
136The overview of CENTCOM press releases shows the near-continuous airstrikes from 1 July until 31
December: www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/?Page=23.
137United States of America, CENTCOM, ‘August 30: Military airstrikes continue against ISIS terrorists in
Syria and Iraq’ (30 August 2017) www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/
Article/1294485/august-30-military-airstrikes-continue-against-isis-terrorists-in-syria-and-iraq/.
138United States of America, CENTCOM, ‘Coalition Statement on ISIS Convoy’ (30 August 2017) www.
centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/1294873/coalition-statement-on-isis-
convoy/.
139Ibid.
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In spite of these precision operations, Syria accused the US-led coalition of
civilian casualties on numerous occasions,140 as well as of attacks against
infrastructure and economic installations.141
The simultaneous operations by Russia and US-backed forces also caused
several incidents between the two. On 25 September, the SDF (an alliance of
Kurdish and Arab militias fighting with the American-led coalition against IS)
asserted that Russian jets targeted them in the oil-rich province Deir al-Zor,
leaving one SDF fighter dead and two others injured.142
Russia denied that it had launched the attack, although a few days
earlier Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov had warned that his troops would
attack areas occupied by American units and US-backed fighters if
Russian forces would come under fire: ‘Any attempts to open fire from
areas where SDF fighters are located would be quickly shut down.…
140Identical letters dated 30 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,
UN Doc S/2017/655 (3 August 2017); Identical letters dated 2 August 2017 from the Permanent
Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/675 (8 August 2017); Identical
letters dated 6 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,
UN Doc S/2017/684 (8 August 2017); Identical letters dated 17 August 2017 from the Chargé d’af-
faires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/717 (16 August
2017); Identical letters dated 23 August 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent
Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/732 (24 August 2017); Identical letters
dated 21 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council; UN
Doc S/2017/793 (25 September 2017); Identical letters dated 28 September 2017 from the Perma-
nent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Sec-
retary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/812 (9 September 2017);
Identical letters dated 3 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Repub-
lic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security
Council, UN Doc S/2017/834 (5 October 2017); Identical letters dated 24 October 2017 from the
Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/893
(31 October 2017); Identical letters dated 12 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative
of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the Pre-
sident of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/952 (15 November 2017); Identical letters dated 14
December 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,
UN Doc S/2017/1052 (15 December 2017).
141Identical letters dated 12 July 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and President of the
Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/603 (14 July 2017); Identical letters dated 3 August 2017 from the Per-
manent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General and President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/673 (8 August 2017); Identical letters
dated 27 December 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab
Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security
Council, UN Doc S/2017/1115 (28 December 2017).
142‘U.S.-backed alliance says Russian jets struck its fighters in east Syria’, Reuters (25 September 2017)
www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-sdf/u-s-backed-alliance-says-russian-jets-struck-its-
fighters-in-east-syria-idUSKCN1C0118.
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Firing positions in those areas will be immediately suppressed with all
military means’.143
Russia and the US-led coalition also clashed beside the battlefield. After
Russia transmitted a damning report about the Syria Civil Defense (also
known as the ‘White Helmets’) to the Secretary-General,144 the US and its
partners replied that the document contained ‘false, misleading and inaccur-
ate allegations.’ Furthermore, the coalition accused the ‘Syrian authorities and
allied forces [of attacking] civilians and civilian facilities’ and doing so by
employing ‘the now infamous “follow-on strikes”, in which aircraft conduct
a second attack as soon as rescue operations begin’.145
Meanwhile, Russia’s continuedmilitary operations in Syria received fierce cri-
ticismbecause of an alleged high number of civilian casualties. The SyrianObser-
vatory for Human Rights (SOHR) said that at least 34 civilians died during a
Russian air raid on ferries in the Euphrates River in Deir Az Zor.146 Russia, for
its part, accused the SOHR of fabricating stories in favour of extremists.147 The
same denial took place later that month when Russian and Syrian air strikes
were accused of killing at least 150 non-combatants in the northwest of Syria.148
Incidents between Syria and Turkey
Tensions between Syria and Turkey ran high when Turkey decided to ramp up
its involvement in the conflict in Syria from 17 July onwards. In the span of a
week, Syria decried the operations of Turkish forces in three letters to the UN
Security Council, describing them as ‘illegal acts that constitutemilitary aggres-
sion’,149 actions that ‘blatantly violate international law’150 and ‘repeated
143David Filipov and Liz Sly, ‘Russia threatens retaliatory strikes against U.S. troops and their allies in Syria’,
Washington Post (21 December 2017) www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-warns-of-retaliation-if-
facing-fire-from-us-led-coalitionin-syria/2017/09/21/00e3b81c-9eba-11e7-8ed4-a750b67c552b_story.
html?utm_term=.b8f644756e30.
144Letter dated 10 May 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Fed-
eration to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/71/910–S/2017/415 (19 May
2017).
145Letter dated 11 July 2017 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United
States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/
2017/598 (11 July 2017).
146‘Russian air raids kill 34 civilians near Deir Az Zor’, Al Jazeera (10 September 2017) www.aljazeera.com/
news/2017/09/russian-air-strikes-kill-34-civilians-deir-az-zor-170910162742746.html.
147‘Russia denies it killed civilians in air strikes on Syria’s Idlib’, Reuters (26 September 2017) www.in.
reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-russia/russia-denies-it-killed-civilians-in-air-strikes-on-syrias-
idlib-idINKCN1C10PC.
148‘Opposition says 150 civilians killed in Russian, Syrian raids on Idlib’, Reuters (27 September 2017) www.
reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-idlib/opposition-says-150-civilians-killed-in-russian-syrian-
raids-on-idlib-idUKKCN1C233M.
149Identical letters dated 29 June 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of
the Security Council, UN Doc A/71/975–S/2017/562 (7 July 2017).
150Identical letters dated 6 July 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian
Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Secur-
ity Council, UN Doc A/71/972–S/2017-582 (11 July 2017).
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aggressions… against the sovereignty and territory of Syria’.151 Turkey replied
in a letter that it ‘categorically refutes the spurious allegations contained in
those and other letters to the same effect’ and that it ‘will not hesitate to exercise
its inherent right of self-defence as outlined in Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations in response to threats to its national security’.152
Despite this heated exchange, the only other incident between Turkey and
Syria’s Assad regime to still occur was in October when Turkey refused the
Syrian demand to withdraw its troops from the Idlib province. A Turkish offi-
cial maintained that the deployment had been implemented in close military
coordination with Russian forces, with a view to establishing a de-escalation
area as agreed with Moscow and Tehran.153
Not long hereafter, on 21 November, the Syrian Kurdish YPG – tra-
ditionally an ally of the United States in the fight against IS – accused
Turkey of ‘aggression’ after Turkey sent forces into areas of Syria adjacent
to the city of Afrin to counter the growing influence of the YPG
militia.154 A fully-fledged ground offensive by Turkish forces in the Afrin
region would follow in January 2018 (more on this in the next Digest of
State Practice).
Incidents between Syria and Israel
In a remarkable accident, the words of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Neta-
nyahu were accidentally broadcast to reporters during a closed-door meeting
with the prime ministers of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slova-
kia. As a result, journalists could hear Netanyahu state first-hand that Israel
had carried out ‘dozens and dozens’ of attacks155 against Iranian arms
convoys in Syria destined for Hezbollah.
We blocked the border not only in Egypt but in the Golan Heights.…We built
the wall because there was a problem with ISIS and Iran trying to build a terror
front there. I told Putin, when we see them transferring weapons to Hezbollah,
we will hurt them. We did it dozens of times.156
151Identical letters dated 11 July 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of
the Security Council, UN Doc A/71/981–S/2017/595 (14 July 2017).
152Letter dated 12 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/605 (13 July 2017).
153‘Turkish official rebuffs call for Idlib troop pullout’, Al Jazeera (15 October 2017) www.aljazeera.com/
news/2017/10/turkish-official-rebuffs-call-idlib-troop-pullout-171015100957668.html.
154‘Syrian Kurdish YPG accuses Turkey of Afrin aggression’, Reuters (21 November 2017) www.reuters.com/
article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey/syrian-kurdish-ypg-accuses-turkey-of-afrin-aggression-
idUKKBN1DL1EC.
155Peter Beaumont, ‘Netanyahu attack on EU policy towards Israel caught on microphone’, The Guardian
(19 July 2017) www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/19/eu-will-wither-and-die-if-it-does-not-change-
policy-on-israel-netanyahu.
156Barak Ravid, ‘Israel Struck Hezbollah Targets in Syria Dozens of Times, Netanyahu Reveals in Hot-mic
Remarks’, Haaretz (19 July 2017) www.haaretz.com/israel-news/netanyahu-israel-struck-hezbollah-
targets-in-syria-dozens-of-times-1.5431227.
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Throughout the second half of 2017, Israel went on to conduct several high-
proﬁle military operations in Syria, with jets targeting a military position in
Syria’s Hama province in early September and killing at least seven soldiers.157
The military position seemed to be a facility of the Scientiﬁc Studies and
Research Centre, which the United States has previously designated as
Syria’s chemical weapons manufacturer.158 Syria strongly reacted to the
act,159 as did Lebanon, who asserted that its airspace was violated during
the operation.160
Syria also accused Israel of an attack on a military site in Qunaytirah and
deplored
that the Security Council has not been able to put an end to these Israeli acts of
aggression and condemn them as a blatant violation of the purposes and prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations [and] the rules of international law
… .161
Another incident took place on 1 November, when Israel reportedly con-
ducted an airstrike against a factory near the Syrian city of Homs. Syria
launched a missile at the aircraft but it failed to hit its target.162 This incident
too was condemned by Syria in a letter to the UN Security Council.163 More
incidents followed on 2 and 4 December.164
The foregoing did not stop Israel from sending several letters to the
Council reporting violations of the Agreement on Disengagement between
Israeli and Syrian Forces, and of violations of the Alpha line between the
two countries. A detailed log book of alleged violations during May and
June 2017 was sent, in which Israel asked the United Nations Disengagement
157Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, ‘Israeli missile strikes target missile depots, a research center and
a camp west of Hama killing and injuring 7 members of the regime forces at least’ (7 September 2017)
www.syriahr.com/en/?p=73750.
158United States of America, Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Sanctions 271 Syrian Scientific Studies
and Research Center Staff in Response to Sarin Attack on Khan Sheikhoun’ (24 April 2017) www.treasury.
gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0056.aspx.
159Identical letters dated 7 September 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/763 (8 September 2017).
160Letter dated 8 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, N Doc S/2017/772 (13 September 2017); Identical
letters dated 30 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc A/72/553–S/
2017/915 (8 November 2017).
161Identical letters dated 22 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN
Doc S/2017/887 (25 October 2017).
162‘Israeli air strike hits near Syria’s Homs’, Reuters (1 November 2017) www.reuters.com/article/uk-
mideast-crisis-syria-israel/israeli-air-strike-hits-near-syrias-homs-idUKKBN1D15W2.
163Identical letters dated 2 November 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/923 (3 November 2017).
164Identical letters dated 5 December 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/1020 (5 December 2017).
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Observer Force (UNDOF) to undertake action.165 Similar logs were trans-
mitted for July through September 2017166 and October and November
2017.167
Incidents on the Syria – Lebanon border
The Lebanese militant group Hezbollah and Syrian government forces carried
out a joint operation in July against militia fighters on the Syrian-Lebanese
border. The Lebanese army was deployed on the outskirts of the town of
Arsal, in anticipation of fighters fleeing from Syria into Lebanon.168 Although
Lebanese prime minister Saad al-Hariri had said that the national army would
carry out an operation in the Arsal area, he stated that no coordination had
taken place between his national army and that of Syria.169
Israel – Lebanon: repeated airspace violations and extension of
UNIFIL mandate
The Lebanese government continued providing the UNwith monthly statistical
summaries of alleged Israeli violations of ‘Lebanese airspace, territorial waters
and territory’ in violation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006).170
Lebanon also sent letters concerning two individual alleged violations of the air-
space on 7 and 10 September.171 Israel, for its part, also sent detailed logs of
165Identical letters dated 27 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/645 (27
July 2017).
166Identical letters dated 10 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/
2017/943 (13 November 2017).
167Identical letters dated 29 December 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/
2017/1130 (29 December 2017).
168Laila Bassam and Tom Perry, ‘Hezbollah, Syria army launch offensive at Syrian-Lebanese border’, Reuters
(21 July 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-lebanon/hezbollah-syria-army-launch-
offensive-at-syrian-lebanese-border-idUSKBN1A608S.
169‘Hezbollah, Syria army launch attack on Lebanon border’, Al Jazeera (22 July 2017) www.aljazeera.com/
news/2017/07/hezbollah-syrian-army-launch-attack-border-area-170721035924650.html.
170Identical letters dated 29 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc A/71/
983–S/2017/599 (20 July 2017); Identical letters dated 3 August 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and
the President of the Security Council, UN Doc A/71/1023–S/2017/702 (14 August 2017); Identical
letters dated 22 August 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN
Doc A/71/1040–S/2017/755 (11 September 2017); Identical letters dated 3 October 2017 from the Per-
manent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the
President of the Security Council, UN Doc A/72/533–S/2017/866 (19 October 2017); Identical letters
dated 20 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc A/72/554–S/2017/883 (8
November 2017).
171For the incident on 7 September, see Letter dated 8 September 2017 from the Permanent Represen-
tative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, N Doc S/
2017/772 (13 September 2017) and Identical letters dated 30 October 2017 from the Permanent
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alleged breaches of Israel’s sovereignty,172 and stated that ‘Lebanese violations of
resolution 1701 (2006) are daily occurrences’.173 It furthermore called into ques-
tion the Lebanese government’s efforts to counteract Hezbollah infrastructures
in the south of Lebanon near the Blue Line and decried that the operations of
the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were being obstructed.174
Lebanon rejected the Israeli remarks. Instead, it accused the country of
spying activities, which ‘flagrantly violate the sovereignty of Lebanon and bla-
tantly contradict the obligations of Israel under resolution 1701 (2006)’.175
Furthermore, it reiterated Israel’s repeated alleged violations of the Lebanese
sovereignty by sea, land and air.176
In August 2017, Israel’s ambassador to the UN Danny Danon wrote in an
op-ed for the Wall Street Journal that UNIFIL was failing in fulfilling its
assignment on the Israel-Lebanon border. As a result, he argued, Hezbollah
was allowed to violate UN Security Council resolutions without repercussions,
necessitating a change to UNIFIL’s mandate.177 In spite hereof, the Security
Council unanimously renewed Resolution 1701178 mere days later.179
Israel – Palestine: continued, yet muted, violence
The second half of 2017 proved to be a relatively calm phase in the conflict
between Israel and Palestine. It was only at the end of November that
Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President
of the Security Council, UN Doc A/72/553–S/2017/915 (8 November 2017). For the latter, see Identical
letters dated 11 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc A/72/499–S/2017/
773 (12 September 2017).
172Identical letters dated 10 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/
2017/942 (13 November 2017).
173Identical letters dated 20 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/617 (20
July 2017).
174Identical letters dated 20 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/526 (20
June 2017). Israel asserted in a separate letter that ‘Qais al-Khazali, commander of the Iranian-backed
Iraqi militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, together with members of Hizbullah, visited the Blue Line at the
Fatima Gate’ on 3 December, and a week later a video showed a member of the Saraya al-Salam
militia and several Hizbullah fighters close to the Israeli-Lebanese border. See Identical letters dated
12 December 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/1043 (12 December
2017).
175Identical letters dated 9 August 2017 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of
Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security
Council, UN Doc A/71/1031–S/2017/705 (23 August 2017).
176Ibid.
177Danny Danon ‘Hezbollah Is Running Rings Around U.N. Monitors in Lebanon’, The Wall Street Journal (20
August 2017) www.wsj.com/articles/hezbollah-is-running-rings-around-u-n-monitors-in-lebanon-
1503258487.
178UNSC Res 1701, UN Doc S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006).
179UNSC Res 2373, UN Doc S/RES/2373 (30 August 2017).
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serious incidents started occurring again. On 30 November, Israel announced
that 12 mortars were launched from the Gaza Strip, aimed at its armed
forces,180 and on 7 December it asserted that rockets had been fired from
Palestine into Israel, to which it retaliated:
In response to… projectiles fired at Israel throughout the day… an IDF tank
and an IAF aircraft targeted two military posts in the Gaza Strip. The IDF
holds Hamas responsible for the hostile activity perpetrated against Israel
from the Gaza Strip… 181
The Israeli military said it then attacked a Hamas training compound in Gaza,
although no casualties were reported on either side.182
Yemen: US and Saudi operations continue; tension between Saudi
Arabia and Iran
The conflict in Yemen did not find any resolution in the second half of 2017,
but instead escalated in some of the fiercest fighting yet.
In mid-September, the United States carried out drone strikes on suspected
fighters of Yemen’s al-Qaeda branch AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penin-
sula), killing eight.183 The attacks ratcheted up in intensity in October and
November.184 On 16 October, two drone attacks killed at least 50 al-Qaeda
militants in two IS training camps in the Bayda province,185 while
CENTCOM announced that a 20 November strike had neutralised several
high-ranking AQAP members.186 At least 20 other AQAP fighters were
killed in October when US drone strikes hit their positions in Yemen.
Saudi-led coalition airstrikes continued too, again attracting criticism for
reportedly killing dozens of civilians.187
180Israel, Israeli Defense Forces, ‘In response to 12 mortars shot from the Gaza Strip, the IDF targeted ter-
rorist positions’ (30 November 2017) www.idf.il/en/minisites/press-releases/in-response-to-12-mortars-
shot-from-the-gaza-strip-the-idf-targeted-terrorist-positions/.
181‘Israel strikes Gaza militant posts after fire rockets fired at Israel-army’, Reuters (7 December 2017) www.
reuters.com/article/uk-usa-trump-israel-rockets-army/israel-strikes-gaza-militant-posts-after-fire-
rockets-fired-at-israel-army-idUKKBN1E12FW.
182‘Israel strikes Hamas targets in Gaza after Palestinian rocket attacks’, Reuters (18 December 2017) www.
reuters.com/article/uk-israel-palestinians/israel-strikes-hamas-targets-in-gaza-after-palestinian-rocket-
attacks-idUKKBN1EC0S9.
183‘Five suspected al Qaeda militants killed in Yemen drone strikes’, Reuters (9 September 2017) www.
reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-drones/five-suspected-al-qaeda-militants-killed-in-yemen-drone-
strikes-idUSKCN1BK0OA.
184The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, ‘Yemen: Reported US covert actions 2017’ (16 October 2017)
www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2017.
185United States of America, Department of Defense, ‘U.S. Forces Conduct Strike Against ISIS Training
Camps in Yemen’ (16 October 2017) www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1344561/us-forces-
conduct-strike-against-isis-training-camps-in-yemen/.
186United States of America, CENTCOM, ‘Airstrikes kill AQAP militants in Yemen’ (8 December 2017).
187‘Saudi-led air strikes kill at least 20 Yemeni civilians – officials’, Reuters (19 July 2017) www.reuters.com/
article/uk-yemen-security/saudi-led-air-strikes-kill-at-least-20-yemeni-civilians-officials-idUKKBN1A40SY;
Human Rights Watch, ‘Yemen: Coalition Airstrikes Deadly for Children’ (12 September 2017) www.hrw.
org/news/2017/09/12/yemen-coalition-airstrikes-deadly-children.
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Furthermore, an incident between Iran and Saudi Arabia took place when
on 4 November 2017 a missile was launched from Yemen to Riyadh. In a letter
to the Security Council, Saudi Arabia asserted that it was188
taking appropriate steps to respond to those terrorist acts, to counter the acts of
aggression of the foreign – funded and – backed Houthi-Saleh terrorist militias
and to protect the security and safety of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.
On the basis of an examination of the debris of the missiles launched on 4
November and 22 July 2017, Saudi Arabia moreover ‘conﬁrmed… the role
of the Iranian regime in manufacturing the missiles’:189
That, along with multiple interdictions of weapons originating in Iran and sus-
pected to be on their way to Yemen, is a flagrant violation of Security Council
resolutions 2216 (2015) and 2231 (2015). Moreover, Iran’s continued role in
smuggling weapons to the Houthis and the direct involvement of Hezbollah
in the transfer and operation of weapon technology, including ballistic
missile capability, is a clear sign of Iran’s complete disregard for its inter-
national obligations and clear evidence of its hostile and reckless behaviour
and its support for violence and terrorism threatening the security of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the region and the world.
Iran replied that it
categorically rejects such baseless and unfounded accusations and considers
them destructive, provocative and a ‘threat to use of force’ against a United
Nations Member State in clear defiance of Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the
United Nations.190
An near-identical incident took place when a missile struck an area south of
Riyadh on 19 December.191 During a Security Council debate the next day,
Saudi Arabia reported that
approximately 24 hours ago, on 19 December, the capital of Saudi Arabia,
Riyadh, was the victim of an attempted attack by a ballistic missile that was
wantonly fired from inside Yemeni territory by the rebel Houthi militias,
with Iran’s backing. The missile was aimed at residential areas but was inter-
cepted by the Coalition’s air defence forces.… This abominable act of aggres-
sion comes after an attempt on 4 November by rebel Houthi militias to
188Identical letters dated 7 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc
S/2017/937 (15 November 2017).
189Ibid.
190Letter dated 7 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/
2017/936 (7 November 2017).
191Identical letters dated 22 December 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc
S/2017/1133 (26 December 2017). Stating that ‘Houthi rebel militias have been complicit in firing
numerous Iranian ballistic missile attacks inside Yemen and across the border of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, in flagrant violation of international law and in what may amount to war crimes’.
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target King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh with an Iranian-made bal-
listic missile.192
Qatar blockade
During a joint press conference with US President Donald Trump, Sheikh
Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah, the emir of Kuwait and main mediator in the
Gulf dispute concerning the blockade of Qatar, expressed his satisfaction
with the mediation proceedings between Qatar on the one hand, and Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain on the other. ‘What
is important is that we have stopped any military action,’ Sheikh Sabah said.
That remark, however, did not sit well with the aforementioned four
countries, who quickly released a joint statement saying that ‘[t]he military
option was not and will not be [used] in any circumstance’.193
Bahrain – Iran: pipeline explosion
An incident between Bahrain and Iran took place on 12 November 2017,
when Bahrain blamed an explosion at an oil pipeline on terrorism and
accused Iran of instigating the attack. ‘The blast is the latest example of a ter-
rorist act carried out by terrorists in direct contact with, and under instruc-
tions from, Iran’, a statement quoted Bahrain’s Interior Minister Sheikh
Rashid bin Abdullah al-Khalifa.194 Iran rejected the allegations and denied
any involvement.195
Iran: tension over Iranian missile tests
A continued hotbed of discussion proved to be Iran’s compliance with the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 14 July 2015 and UN Secur-
ity Council Resolution 2231, which endorses the Plan and calls for Iran ‘not to
undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of
delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile
technology’.196
At the tail-end of June, Israel asserted that Iran had ‘conducted a clandes-
tine launch test of the Qiam medium-range missile,… capable of delivering a
nuclear payload of 700 kg over a range of more than 750 km’ on 15 November
192UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8144 (20 December 2017) 40.
193‘Call for GCC dialogue as Trump speaks to Qatar’s emir’, Al Jazeera (8 September 2017) www.aljazeera.
com/news/2017/09/call-gcc-dialogue-trump-speaks-qatar-emir-170908132013870.html.
194Bahrain, Bahrain News Agency, ‘Interior Minister: Oil pipeline fire dangerous terrorist act’ (11 November
2017).
195‘Iran rejects involvement in Bahrain pipeline blast’, Al Jazeera (12 November 2017) www.aljazeera.com/
news/2017/11/iran-rejects-involvement-bahrain-pipeline-blast-171112143200198.html.
196UNSC Res 2231, UN Doc S/RES/2231 (20 July 2015) 99.
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2016, and that it had used a Jewish Star of David as a target marking.197 In the
same letter, Israel called out two more launches on 18 and 19 June 2017 of the
Zulfiqar missile, which it also described as ‘a Missile Technology Control
Regime category one ballistic missile… capable of delivering a nuclear
payload of 500 kg over a range of 700 km’.198 In its reply, Iran denied that
a missile test had taken place on 15 November 2016 but did not deny launches
on 18 and 19 June 2017. It did state, however, that ‘Iranian military capabili-
ties, including ballistic missiles, have not been designed to be capable of deli-
vering nuclear weapons and, thus, are outside the purview of the Security
Council resolution’.199
Another incident took place when Iran launched a Simorgh missile into
space on 27 July 2017, seemingly as an act of defiance against a US House
of Representatives bill that imposed sanctions against Iran (as well as to
Russia and North Korea) a mere three days earlier because of its weapon
development programmes.200 US State Department spokeswoman Heather
Nauert was quoted as saying that ‘[w]e would consider that a violation of
UNSC [resolution] 2231. We consider that to be continued ballistic missile
development.…We believe that what happened… is inconsistent with the
Security Council resolutions’.201 Iran argued, however, that the launch was
‘part of a scientific and technological activity related to the use of space tech-
nology’ and that the Simorgh was ‘designed and developed exclusively for
placing satellites into orbit’, thus making it a space launch vehicle instead
of a ballistic missile system.202
In response to both the US House bill and the statements by Nauert con-
cerning the Simorgh, Iran filed a letter wherein it remarked that the US ‘has
persistently refrained from good-faith implementation of its obligations’ and
‘has embarked on a malicious policy to prevent Iran from benefiting from the
Plan of Action’.203 In October, Iran strongly decried a US announcement that
197Identical letters dated 28 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2017/555 (28
June 2017).
198Ibid.
199Letter dated 17 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/
2017/719 (18 August 2017).
200United States of America, House of Representatives, ‘H.R.3364 – Countering America’s Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act’ (24 July 2017).
201‘U.S. says Iran rocket test breaches U.N. resolution’, Reuters (27 July 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-
iran-satellite/u-s-says-iran-rocket-test-breaches-u-n-resolution-idUSKBN1AC1YY.
202Letter dated 23 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2017/731 (23 August 2017).
203Letter dated 28 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2017/739 (28 August 2017). Similar state-
ments were made in: Letter dated 19 December 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2017/1075 (19
December 2017).
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it was considering listing Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist
organisation.204
Israeli Minister of Intelligence Israel Katz warned during a visit to Tokyo
on 26 October 2017 that ‘[i]f international efforts led these days by US Presi-
dent Trump don’t help stop Iran attaining nuclear capabilities, Israel will act
militarily by itself’.205 This drew a strong response from Iran, stating in a letter
that ‘[Israel’s] recurring threats to act militarily against Iran’s peaceful nuclear
programme is a flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of inter-
national law and Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations’.206
In a letter to the Security Council dated 29 November 2017, Israel drew the
Council’s attention to a ‘deeply disturbing statement made by the Comman-
der of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Major General
Mohammad Ali Jafari’, who had reportedly expressed Iran’s intention to con-
tinue arming Hezbollah and to destroy the State of Israel.207 According to the
letter:
Iran’s activities violate numerous Security Council resolutions egregiously,
including resolution 2231 (2015), which explicitly prohibits the supply, sale
or transfer of arms and related materiel from Iran; resolution 1701 (2006),
which prohibits the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon
except as authorized by its Government; and resolution 1559 (2004).
4. Asia
North Korean: missile tests; US and DPRK exchange threats
In the second half of 2017, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) dramatically stepped up its missile testing programme. On 4 July
2017, North-Korea launched the Hwasong-14, its first-ever intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM). After reaching 2,500 km in altitude, it landed into
Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).208 Experts stated that the missile,
204Letter dated 13 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/
2017/862 (13 October 2017). Note: while US authorities decided to impose sanctions upon the IRGC, they
eventually stopped short of designating it as a terrorist organisation. See Paul D Shinkman, ‘Why Trump
stopped short of designating the IRGC a terrorist group’, US News (13 October 2017) www.usnews.com/
news/national-news/articles/2017-10-13/trump-stops-short-of-designating-irans-irgc-a-terrorist-group.
205Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo, ‘Israel willing to resort to military action to stop Iran acquiring nuclear
weapons – minister’, Reuters (26 October 2017) www.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-nuclear-israel/israel-
willing-to-resort-to-military-action-to-stop-iran-acquiring-nuclear-weapons-minister-idUKKBN1CV0ZS.
206Letter dated 6 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/
2017/934 (7 November 2017).
207Identical letters dated 28 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/
2017/1000 (29 November 2017).
208Michele Nichols, ‘U.S. prepared to use force on North Korea “if we must”: U.N. envoy’, Reuters (4 July
2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles/u-s-prepared-to-use-force-on-north-korea-if-we-
must-u-n-envoy-idUSKBN19P02W.
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while not perfectly reliable, could potentially reach US soil.209 While the
Russian Federation argued that, according to their assessment, the missile
was a mid-range ballistic missile, as opposed to an intercontinental one,210
the North Korean News Agency explicitly confirmed the Hwashong-14
missile to be an ICBM.211 The UN Security Council (UNSC) met the follow-
ing day, for its seventh time in 2017,212 to discuss the North Korea issue. In
spite of Russian reservations, the missile launch was condemned in the
debate by several individual states, who called upon North Korea to comply
with previous UNSC sanctions.213 Nevertheless, no resolution was adopted
at this point. On 28 July 2017, North Korea conducted another launch of
the Hwasong-14.214 Its re-entry vehicle crashed into the sea near Hokkaido,
Japan’s northernmost island.215 On 5 August, the UNSC adopted a new res-
olution, condemning both July missile launches.216 The disagreement on the
exact character of the missiles was settled by noting that DPRK had ‘stated
[that the launches were] of intercontinental ballistic missiles’.217 Responding
to reports that North-Korea had successfully developed the technology to
miniaturise nuclear warheads in order to incorporate them in missiles,218
US President Donald Trump stated on 8 August 2017, at a press briefing in
Bedminster, New Jersey, that North Korea would be ‘met with fire and fury
like the world has never seen’, if it did not alter its threatening discourse.219
In response, Pyongyang mere hours later warned that it would consider con-
ducting missile strikes on the US Pacific territory of Guam.220 NATO Sec-
retary-General Jens Stoltenberg refused to confirm or deny that an attack
209John Schilling, ‘What is true and not true about North Korea’s Hwasong-14 ICBM: A technical evalu-
ation’, 38 North (10 July 2017) www.38north.org/2017/07/jschilling071017/.
210UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.7996 (5 July 2017).
211Ibid.
212For an overview of North Korean practice in 2016 and 2017, see Ruys, Ferro, Verlinden and Vander
Maelen (eds) (n 68) 200–1; Ruys, Ferro and Vander Maelen (eds) (n 75) 408–11.
213Michelle Nichols, ‘Russia objects to U.N. condemnation of North Korea, says test was not ICBM’, Reuters
(6 July 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missile-un/russia-objects-to-u-n-condemnation-of-
north-korea-says-test-was-not-icbm-idUSKBN19R2CO.
214David E Sanger, Choe Sang-Hun and William J Broad, ‘North Korea Tests a Ballistic Missile That Experts
Say Could Hit California, New York Times (28 July 2017) www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/world/asia/north-
korea-ballistic-missile.html.
215Mike Wall, ‘Re-entry vehicle failed during North Korea’s 2nd ICBM test, video suggests’, Space (2 August
2017) www.space.com/37687-north-korea-icbm-test-re-entry-vehicle.html.
216UNSC Res 2371, UN Doc S/RES/2371 (5 August 2017).
217Ibid, Preamble.
218Joby Warrick, Ellen Nakashima and Anna Fifield, ‘North Korea now making missile ready nuclear
weapons, US analysts say’, Washington Post (8 August 2017) www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/north-korea-now-making-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/
e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html.
219Noah Bierman, ‘Trump warns North Korea of “fire and fury”’, LA Times (8 August 2017) www.latimes.
com/politics/washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates-trump-warns-north-korea-of-fire-and-
1502220642-htmlstory.html; P J Crowley, ‘North Korea crisis: Where to now after “fire and fury”’, BBC
News (9 August 2017) www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40871754.
220‘North Korea “considering missile strike on US Guam base”’, BBC News (9 August 2017) www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-40871416.
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on Guam would trigger NATO Article 5, which requires members of the alli-
ance to come to the defence of one other.221
On 25 August, North-Korea launched three Short-Range Ballistic Mis-
siles.222 The timed launches prompted diverging assessments of the nature
of the projectiles by several experts.223 The missiles crashed into the sea
and did not enter the Japanese EEZ.224 A few days later, on 29 August
2017, North Korea launched a Hwasong-12 ballistic missile that passed
over Northern Japan. The Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, condemned
the missile launch, stating that the test was ‘an unprecedented, serious and
important threat’.225 The White House warned that ‘all options are on the
table’.226 The Security Council, in its emergency session on 29 August 2017,
reiterated its condemnation of North Korea’s behaviour through a presiden-
tial statement.227
Seemingly undeterred by repeated warnings and condemnations from the
Security Council, North Korea on 2 September 2017 conducted a hydrogen
bomb test in a subterranean military facility.228 This test constituted North
Korea’s first nuclear detonation since 9 September 2016. Notwithstanding
Russian scepticism,229 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution con-
demning North Korea’s nuclear activity and imposing additional sanc-
tions.230After the sanctions were announced, the North Korean
government stated the sanctions justified its nuclear programme and
vowed to proceed with a ‘faster pace’.231 On 14 September, North Korea
issued a statement in which it threatened to ‘sink Japan and turn US to
221‘NATO’s Stoltenberg says North Korea’s “reckless behaviour” requires global response’, Reuters (10 Sep-
tember 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-nato/natos-stoltenberg-says-north-
koreas-reckless-behavior-requires-global-response-idUSKCN1BL0AT?il=0.
222‘North Korea fires three missiles into sea’, BBC News (26 August 2017) www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
41058152.
223Ankit Panda, ‘What kind of missiles did North Korea launch on August 26?’, The Diplomat (28 August
2017) https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/what-kind-of-missiles-did-north-korea-launch-on-august-26/.
224Jesse Johnson and Reiji Yoshida, ‘North Korea fires missile over Japan in sharp escalation of tensions’,
Japan Times (29 August 2017) www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/08/29/national/north-korea-fires-
missile-japan-reportedly-breaks-falls-pacific/#.WqJhFdDiaUk.
225Barney Henderson, Julian Ryall, Neil Connor and Chris Graham, ‘“All options are on the table”: Donald
Trump says world has received North Korea’s message “loud and clear” after Kim Jong-un fires missile
over Japan’, The Telegraph (29 August 2017) www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/28/north-korea-fires-
missile-japan-warns-citizens-take-precautions/.
226US, ‘Statement by President Donald J Trump on North Korea’, The White House (August 29 2017) www.
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-north-korea/.
227UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8034 (29 August 2017).
228‘North Korea nuclear test: Hydrogen bomb “missile-ready”’, BBC News (3 September 2017) www.bbc.
com/news/world-asia-41139445.
229Vladimir Putin declared on 5 September that ‘ramping up military hysteria in such conditions is sense-
less; it’s a dead end.’, See Justin McCurry and Tom Phillips, ‘North Korea nuclear crisis: Putin warns of
planetary catastrophe’, The Guardian (5 September 2017) www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/05/
south-korea-minister-redeploying-us-nuclear-weapons-tensions-with-north.
230UNSC Res 2375, UN Doc S/RES/2375 (11 September 2017).
231Kanga Kong, ‘North Korea Slams “Evil sanctions, vows faster nuclear push”’, Bloomberg (13 September
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ashes and darkness’.232 The following day, on 15 September 2017, it
launched a new ballistic missile over Hokkaido, the northernmost island
of Japan. North Korea declared that any further sanctions would provoke
more missile launches.233 At his first UN General Assembly speech, US Pre-
sident Donald Trump on 19 September 2017 vowed to ‘totally destroy’
North Korea if it threatened the United States.234 Responding to a 24 Sep-
tember tweet by the US President, North Korea accused Donald Trump of
‘declaring war’ on the state.235 The White House responded that it had not
done so.236
After a two-month period of relative calm, North Korea again launched a
(Hwasong-15) ballistic missile, which crashed into the Sea of Japan.237 The
UN Security Council again condemned the ballistic missile in the strongest
terms and further tightened sanctions on North Korea in its Resolution
2397 of 22 December 2017.238
India and China: Doklam standoff
In mid-June 2017, a military standoff arose between Chinese and Indian
forces at the tri-junction between Bhutan, China and India.239 The position
of Bhutan was that Chinese troops and road workers started constructing a
‘motorable road from Dokola in the Doklam area towards the Bhutan
Army camp at Zompelri’,240 and that China should refrain from the use of
force and respect the status quo until the border dispute was finally settled,
as agreed in written bilateral agreements.241 India supported Bhutan in its
argument. On 30 June, the Indian Ministry of External affairs stated in a
press release that China was in violation of the 2012 bilateral understanding
concerning the tri-junction.242 On the same day a spokesperson for the
232Justin McCurry, ‘We will sink Japan and turn US to “ashes and darkness”, says North Korea’, The Guardian
(14 September 2017) www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/14/north-korea-threat-sink-japan-us-
ashes-darkness.
233‘North Korea says sanctions will accelerate nuclear programme’, BBC News (18 September 2017) www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41309774.
234Donald J. Trump, ‘Statement by H.E. Donald Trump – President of the United States of America’ (19
September 2017) https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/72/us_en.pdf.
235Zachary Cohen, ‘North Korea accuses Trump of declaring war’, CNN (26 September 2017) https://edition.
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Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Doklam had always been
within Chinese jurisdiction.243
Throughout July and early August 2017, the Chinese government issued
various statements and warnings, whereas India struck a rather conciliatory
tone in its public outings.244 China argued that its sovereignty over Doklam
was established in an 1890 convention between Great Britain and China relat-
ing to Sikkim and Tibet, and that Indian P.M. Nehru agreed to that arrange-
ment.245 The Indian press objected to that Chinese interpretation.246 China
further posited on 5 July 2017 that it had a consensus with Bhutan with
regards to border demarcations, and that India should not interfere.247
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated on 24 July that Indian troops
should leave the Doklam area.248
On 2 August, China released a 15-page official position paper entitled ‘The
Facts and China’s Position Concerning the Indian Border Troops’ Crossing of
the China–India Boundary in the Sikkim Sector into the Chinese Territory’,249
in which it accused India of using the incident as ‘a pretext’ for interference in
China-Bhutan bilateral relations. China restated that India’s actions
amounted to a violation of both Chinese and Bhutanese territorial sover-
eignty.250 Some passages of the document merit being restated in full:
6. Since 18 June [2017], the Indian border troops have illegally crossed the
China–India boundary in the Sikkim Sector and entered the Chinese territory.
This is an undeniable fact. The incident occurred in an area where there is a
clear and delimited boundary. This makes it fundamentally different from
past frictions between the border troops of the two sides in areas with undelim-
ited boundary. The Indian border troops’ crossing of the already delimited
boundary is a very serious incident, as it violates China’s sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity…
9. India has cited ‘serious security implications’ of China’s road building as a
justification for its illegal crossing of the boundary. According to UN
243China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference
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General Assembly Resolution 3314 adopted on 14 December 1974, no con-
sideration of whatsoever nature, whether political, economic, military or other-
wise, may serve as a justification for the invasion or attack by the armed forces
of a State of the territory of another State. To cross a delimited boundary and
enter the territory of a neighboring country on the grounds of so-called ‘secur-
ity concerns’, for whatever activities, runs counter to the basic principles of
international law and basic norms governing international relations. No
such attempt will be tolerated by any sovereign State, still less should it be
the normal way of conduct between China and India as two neighboring
States.…
14. Since the incident occurred, China has shown utmost goodwill and great
restraint and sought to communicate with India through diplomatic channels
to resolve the incident. But no country should ever underestimate the resolve
of the Chinese government and people to defend China’s territorial sovereignty.
China will take all necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate and lawful
rights and interests. The incident took place on the Chinese side of the delim-
ited boundary. India should immediately and unconditionally withdraw its
trespassing border troops back to the Indian side of the boundary. This is a pre-
requisite and basis for resolving the incident.
A day after the release of the position paper, China’s Foreign Ministry accused
India of ‘always keeping “peace” on the tip of its tongue’, but acting contrary
to what it says.251 On 10 August 2017, Bhutan denied the claim that it had
acknowledged that Doklam is Chinese territory.252 Tensions brieﬂy ﬂared
up on 16 August 2017, after a scufﬂe between Chinese and Indian troops
along a different contested border in the western Himalayas on 16 August,
after which delegations from both countries met to ‘maintain peace and
tranquillity’.253
On 28 August 2017, as India’s PMNarendraModi was set to go to China for
the 2017BRICS summit, China and India announced that theywouldwithdraw
their respective troops from the disputed Doklam border region.254 Bhutan
expressed its relief in a brief press statement the following day.255 On 9
October 2017, China announced its readiness tomaintain peace at the frontiers
with India, after Indian Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s visit to
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Nathu La.256 Indian and Chinese relations were tested one last time in Decem-
ber, when China claimed that an Indian drone had crashed within Chinese ter-
ritory. China refused, however, to give an exact location of the incident.257 The
Indian Press Information Bureau released a response from the Ministry of
Defence, in which it states that Indian border security personnel lost contact
with the UAV while it was conducting a routine operation.258
Japan: new Defence White Paper
In August 2017, Japan released its annual Defence of Japan white paper.259
Apart from minor changes, the 2017 paper did not differ significantly in
content from the 2016 edition. The paper reiterates the new interpretation
of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution in the wake of the Cabinet decision
of 1 July 2014,260 as allowing for the use of force in self-defence subject to the
following cumulative conditions:261
. When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed
attack against a foreign country that is in a closer relationship with
Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear
danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and
pursuit of happiness.
. When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and
ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.
. Use of force to the minimum extent necessary.
As to the latter requirement, the White Paper explains that ‘as a general rule,
the Constitution does not permit troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or
airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deploy-
ment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level of
self-defense.’262 In a similar vein, occupation of enemy territory ‘would exceed
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the minimum necessary level of self-defense and is not permissible’.263 Else-
where the White Paper suggests that an ‘anticipated armed attack situation’,
understood as ‘a situation where an armed attack has yet to occur, but circum-
stances are growing increasingly strained and an armed attack is anticipated’,
can equally give rise to self-defense.264 The White Paper also envisages the
deployment of troops ‘to rescue Japanese nationals overseas’, yet such oper-
ations are ostensibly subject to the ‘consent’ of the country concerned, or
the organisation administering the territory in accordance with a UN resol-
ution.265 Finally, Japan again stressed the seriousness of the North-Korean
threat, and renews its apprehension about Chinese incursions into Japanese
waters.266
Despite the fact that not much in the white paper had changed over the
year, China and South Korea felt compelled to react via statements from
their respective ministries of foreign affairs. China was ‘strongly dissatisfied
with and strongly opposed to’ Japan’s assessment of Chinese policy.267
According to its Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Japan’s paper ‘made irre-
sponsible remarks on China’s maritime activities and tried to stir up troubles
on the South China Sea issue’.268 South Korea, in its turn, ‘strongly protest[ed]
against the Japanese government’s repeated inclusion of unjust claims to
Dokdo’, and demanded ‘an immediate withdrawal of such claims’.269
China/Japan – tension over Chinese military flights over the Miyako
Strait
Stating that it would organise even more ‘far-sea exercises’, the Chinese Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs downplayed military flights over the Miyako Strait
between Japan’s Miyako and Okinawa islands.270 China urged Japan to not
be alarmed by future flights over the strait and to ‘get used to it’.271 The
Chinese Air Force flew six Xian H-6K long-range bombers through the stra-
tegically significant Miyako Strait on 13 July 2017, Japan’s Ministry of Defence
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stated in a press release.272 In response, the Japan Air Self-Defence Force
(JASDF) scrambled a number of its own fighter jets. According to a Japanese
press statement, the Chinese airforce excursions did not violate Japanese
airspace.273
China/US – US ‘Freedom of navigation’ operations in the South China
Sea and Chinese response
In early July 2017, the US sailed its USS Stethem war ship close to Triton
Island, part of the contested Paracel islands in the South China Sea. China
responded by sending military vessels and fighter jets to the area.274 The
Chinese Ministry of Defence issued a statement in which it ‘resolutely
opposed the illegal entry of a US missile destroyer into China’s territorial
waters off the Xisha Islands’275 (as the Paracel islands are known in
Chinese). During a phone call between President Xi of China and US Presi-
dent Trump, Mr. Xi told Mr. Trump that negative factors were affecting
US–China relations.276 A month later, on 10 August 2017, the US conducted
another ‘freedom of navigation’ operation in the South China Sea, near
Nansha Qundao island in the – equally contested – Spratley archipelago.277
The Chinese armed forces sent ships to the USS McCain and warned it to
leave.278 China stressed that it has ‘indisputable sovereignty over Nansha
Qundao and its adjacent waters’.279 According to a press statement of the
Defence Ministry, China saw repeated US incursions as an incentive to
‘beef up defence capability’.280
Nevertheless, on 11 October 2017, the missile destroyer USS Chafee again
made its way through the South China Sea, near the Paracel islands.281 China
responded with ships and fighter planes to warn the US ship away from the
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area it claims as its sovereign territory.282 It complained in a press statement
that the US ‘violated relevant Chinese and international law’.283
India/Pakistan – mutual accusations of ceasefire violations and
border crossings
Throughout the second half of 2017, India and Pakistan exchanged accusa-
tions of ceasefire violations, illegal border crossings, and other violations of
international law. In a July 2017 press briefing, a spokesperson for the
Indian Ministry of External affairs, alleged that, at that point, Pakistan had
been involved in 240 border violations in 2017.284 Questioned about the
alleged285 use of chemical weapons by India, he stated that claims by Pakistani
media were ‘completely baseless and incorrect’.286 On 8 August 2017, India
summoned a Pakistani official to the Ministry of External Affairs following
the killing of an Indian soldier in a border skirmish in the Krishna Ghati
border sector.287 When a ‘terrorist’ organisation ‘infiltrated the Indian
border’ and ‘carried out a terror attack in Pulwama’ on 17 August 2017, the
Indian Ministry of External Affairs demanded an investigation from Paki-
stan.288 India called upon Pakistan to
abide by its commitment not to allow its territory or territories under its control
to be used for terrorism in any manner and take credible and effective action
against the terrorist entities operating from its soil and to prevent cross
border infiltration.289
InDecember 2017, Pakistan repeatedly summoned Indianofﬁcials to itsMinistry
of Foreign Affairs with regards to alleged border and ceaseﬁre violations. On 8
December 2017, it accused Indian soldiers of attacking a funeral prayer ceremony
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without any prior provocation.290 Pakistan accused India of violating inter-
national humanitarian law and acting contrary to human dignity.291 Pakistan
stated that in 2017, India had committed over 1,300 ceaseﬁre violations, resulting
in54civilian casualties and 174 injured.292Apart fromaccusing India of violating
the Kashmiri right to self-determination,293 Pakistan complained of violations to
the right of assembly, torture, arbitrary arrests, and extra-judicial killings by India
in the Jammu/Kashmir region. Finally, on 25 December 2017, Pakistan alleged
India to have violated the ceaseﬁre in the Rakhchikri sector along the Line of
Control between the two countries, while simultaneously denying any border
crossings by Pakistani military personnel.294
5. Americas
United States threatens military action against Venezuela
Against the background of a wave of protests against the government of Pre-
sident Nicolas Maduro and dozens of casualties in protest-related violence,295
US President Trump on 11 August 2017 appeared to threaten military action
against Venezuela: ‘The people [of Venezuela] are suffering and they are
dying. We have many options for Venezuela including a possible military
option if necessary’.296 Venezuela’s Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino
called the threat ‘an act of craziness’.297 President Nicolas Madura responded
with calls for military exercises to prepare for an ‘imperialist’ invasion.298 Two
days of military drills were effectively held later in August. President Maduro
wrote on Twitter that ‘[t]he people and the FANB [i.e. the Venezuelan Army]
are defending territory and sovereignty’.299 An announcement broadcast on
state television stated that ‘[a]gainst the belligerent threats of the United
States, all Venezuelans between the ages of 18 and 60 are required to contrib-
ute to the integral defence of the nation’.300
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The US threat to use military force was widely condemned across Latin
America, including by Mercosur as well as several individual countries,301
with some warning that the it was counterproductive and could bolster the
position of Maduro.302
United States-Cuba: row over alleged ‘sonic’ attacks US diplomats
On10August 2017, theUnited States expelled twoCuban diplomats after several
US diplomats suffered severe hearing loss that was thought to be from a covert
sonic device. US State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert state that
[s]ome US government personnel who were working at our embassy in
Havana, Cuba… reported some incidents which have caused a variety of phys-
ical symptoms. As a result of that, we’ve asked two Cubans to leave the United
States, and they have.303
The Cuban government denied the alleged incidents. The foreignministry said
in a statement: ‘Cuba has never, nor would ever, allow the Cuban territory to be
used for any kind of action against accredited diplomats or their families’.304 At
least one Canadian diplomat also suffered similar symptoms and was treated
for hearing loss. A spokeswoman for the Canadian foreign ministry said that
ofﬁcials were ‘aware of unusual symptoms affecting Canadian and US diplo-
matic personnel and their families in Havana. The government is actively
working – includingwithUS andCuban authorities – to ascertain the cause’.305
In late September, the United States announced the withdrawal of 60% of
its diplomatic staff and all family members from its embassy in Cuba.306 The
union representing US diplomats said the attacks had caused ‘mild traumatic
brain injury’ and ‘permanent hearing loss’. An anonymous official stated that
‘[u]ntil the government of Cuba can ensure the safety of US government per-
sonnel in Cuba, our embassy will be reduced to emergency personnel so as to
minimise the number of US government personnel at risk of exposure’.307 An
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official of the Cuban foreign ministry declared the US decision to be ‘hasty’,
noting that it would ‘affect bilateral relations’.308 On 3 October, the US
expelled 15 Cuban diplomats from the United States. US Secretary of State
Rex Tillerson said the decision constituted a reaction to ‘Cuba’s failure to
take appropriate steps to protect our diplomats in accordance with its obli-
gations under the Vienna Convention’.309 Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, Cuba’s
foreign minister, said the move was ‘eminently political’ as well as ‘unwar-
ranted and unjustifiable’.310
United States: reports of new policy on the use of lethal force outside
areas of active hostilities, new AUMF proposal
In late October 2017, it was reported that US President Trump signed a new
policy for the use of lethal force outside traditional battlefields.311 The reported
new policy would replace an Obama-era policy,312 keeping the requirement of
‘near certainty’ that no civilians would be killed but reducing the requirement
for ‘near certainty’ that the target is present to ‘reasonable certainty’. The
requirement that a target post a ‘continuing imminent threat’ was also
suggested to have been removed. In contrast to the approach of the Obama
administration, no redacted version of the policy framework was made public.
Meanwhile, several members of Congress introduced a proposal for a new
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) resolution tailored to the
US’ ongoing operations.313 On 30 October, the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee held a hearing on the AUMF question.314 US Secretary of
Defense James Mattis and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson testified.
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